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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Roosevelt Simmons, Petitioner,  
v. 
Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. and St. John's Water 
Company, Inc., Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001477 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Charleston County 

Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity 

Opinion No. 27674 

Heard October 20, 2015 – Filed November 2, 2016 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED 

Edward A. Bertele, of Charleston, for Petitioner.
John B. Williams and J. Jay Hulst, both of Williams &
Hulst, L.L.C., of  Moncks Corner; Gaines  W. Smith and  
Jeffrey C. Moore, both of Legare, Hare & Smith, of 
Charleston, all for Respondents. 
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ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: In this property dispute 
concerning utility easements, we granted Roosevelt Simmons' petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in Simmons v. Berkeley Electric 
Cooperative, 404 S.C. 172, 744 S.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 2013). Simmons asserts the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the master-in-equity's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of St. John's Water Company, Inc. ("St. John's Water") on the 
basis that it had established a prescriptive easement. Simmons further asserts the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the master's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Berkeley Electric") on the grounds 
that it had been granted an express easement and that it had established a
prescriptive easement to maintain the power lines in their current configuration.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
I. Factual/Procedural History 
In 2003, Simmons acquired title to two parcels of land, TMS # 283-00-00-
498 ("Tract 498") and TMS # 282-00-00-135 ("Tract 135"). Both parcels are 
undeveloped, wooded, and located along Kitford Road on Johns Island. The 
parcels are separated by an abandoned railroad right-of-way and were previously 
part of a larger tract owned by two of Simmons' predecessors-in-title, Edward
Heyward and E.C. Brown. In 1956, Heyward granted an  easement to Berkeley 
Electric to construct and maintain transmission lines over what is now Tract 498 
and Tract 135. In 1972, Brown granted an easement to Berkeley Electric to 
construct and maintain distribution lines over Tract 498. 
In 1977, Charleston County issued an encroachment permit authorizing St. 
John's Water to install a water main along Kitford Road pursuant to an 
accompanying map that illustrated the water main's approved location. St. John's 
Water finished construction on the water main in 1978. In 2005, Simmons 
discovered a water meter under bushes on Tract 135. Simmons subsequently 
contacted St. John's Water, which informed Simmons that it would not move the 
water main because it believed it had an easement giving it the right to use the 
property. St. John's Water based its belief on the encroachment permit and its 
understanding that the water main had been in its current location for more than 
twenty years. Pursuant to a request by Simmons, St. John's Water "blue-flagged" 
13 

  
 
 
 
  
 
  
    
 
 
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
                                        
  
the property. The blue flags showed the water main crossing both Tract 135 and 
Tract 498.1 
In 2008, Simmons commenced this action against Berkeley Electric and St. 
John's Water alleging trespass and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Simmons
alleged Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water trespassed on his property by 
constructing, placing, and maintaining unauthorized power and water lines. In 
doing so, Simmons claimed Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water had been 
"furnished with a non-gratuitous and valuable benefit without paying for its 
reasonable value." Simmons also sought a declaration that neither utility company
had property interests or rights to his property. 
Both Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water moved for summary judgment.  
After presiding over the summary judgment hearings, the master granted both 
motions for summary judgment. With respect to Berkeley Electric, the master  
determined any transmission and distribution lines over Simmons' property were 
permitted under the 1956 and 1972 easements. To the extent the lines were not
within the scope of the express easements, the master found Berkeley Electric 
established a prescriptive easement to the lines in their current configuration. As 
to St. John's  Water, the master  determined the encroachment permit served as an 
express easement granting St. John's Water the right to use Simmons' property to
construct the water main. To the extent that the water main was not covered under 
the express easement, the master held St. John's Water established a prescriptive 
easement to maintain the water main in its current configuration. Simmons 
appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the master's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Berkeley Electric, finding Berkeley Electric did not exceed the scope of 
the express easements. Simmons, 404 S.C. at 179-80, 744 S.E.2d at 584-85. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the master's finding that Berkeley Electric 
established a prescriptive easement for the power lines in their current 
configuration. Id. at 181-82, 744 S.E.2d at 585-86. As to St. John's Water, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. 
John's Water on the basis that it established a prescriptive easement, but reversed 
the master's finding that it had an express easement after determining Charleston 
1 The blue flags also showed the water main was not located along Kitford Road, 
but north of Kitford Road across Simmons' property.   
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 County lacked the authority to grant a right to use property owned by another.  Id. 
at 183-85, 744 S.E.2d at 586-87.  The Court of Appeals remanded the action to the 
master for a determination   of whether there are additional water lines under 
Simmons' property.  Id. at 185, 744 S.E.2d at 587.  We granted Simmons' petition 
for a writ of certiorari following the Court of Appeals' denial of his petition for 
rehearing. 
 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court applies 
the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, which 
provides that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002); Rule 56(c), 
SCRCP.  "When determining if any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party."  Fleming, 350 S.C. at 493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860.   
III. Discussion 
 
A. St. John's Water 
 
Simmons asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the master's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of St. John's Water.  We agree. 
 
"An easement is a right given to a person to use the land of another for a 
specific purpose."  Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 304, 772 S.E.2d 163, 169 
(2015).  "A prescriptive easement is not implied by law but is established by the 
conduct of the dominant tenement owner."  Boyd v. BellSouth Tel. Tel. Co., 369 
S.C. 410, 419, 633 S.E.2d 136, 141 (2006).  To establish a prescriptive easement, 
the claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence:  "(1) the continued and 
uninterrupted use or enjoyment of the right for a period of 20 years; (2) the identity 
of the thing enjoyed; and (3) the use [was] adverse under claim of right."  
Darlington Cnty. v. Perkins, 269 S.C. 572, 576, 239 S.E.2d 69, 71 (1977).  
"[W]hen it appears that claimant has enjoyed an easement openly, notoriously, 
continuously, and uninterruptedly, in derogation of another's rights, for the full 
period of 20 years, the use will be presumed to have been adverse."  Williamson v. 
15 

  
 
 
 
  
   
   
  
   
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
   
 
   
                                        
  
  
 
Abbott, 107 S.C. 397, 400, 93 S.E. 15, 16 (1917). "[A] party claiming a 
prescriptive easement has the burden of proving all elements by clear and  
convincing evidence." Bundy, 412 S.C. at 306, 772 S.E.2d at 170.  
In Horry County v. Laychur, this Court articulated the third element of a
prescriptive easement as requiring the claimant's use to be "adverse or under a
claim of right." 315 S.C. 364, 367, 434 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1993). In relying on this 
language, the Court of Appeals has recognized two methods of proving the third 
element: one established through "adverse use" and one through a "claim  of  
right."2 According to the Court of Appeals, "[t]o establish an easement by 
prescription, one need only establish either a justifiable claim of right or adverse 
and hostile use." Jones v. Daley, 363 S.C. 310, 316, 609 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Ct. App.
2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, if a claimant cannot prove the elements of 
adverse use, then, under the Court of Appeals' approach, the claimant could 
establish a prescriptive easement under a claim of right. "[I]n order for a party to 
earn a prescriptive easement under claim of right he must demonstrate a substantial 
belief that he had the right to use the [property] based upon the totality of 
circumstances surrounding his use." Hartley v. John Wesley United Methodist 
Church of Johns Island, 355 S.C. 145, 151, 584 S.E.2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Here, the Court of Appeals determined "St. John's Water established the 
water main was installed under a claim of right." Simmons, 404 S.C. at 184, 744 
S.E.2d at 587. To support its determination, the Court of Appeals relied on an 
affidavit of Hugh S. Miley, an engineer involved in the design, permitting, and 
construction of the water main. Id. In his affidavit, Miley attested that:  
Charleston County issued an encroachment permit for the water main; construction 
on the water main began in 1977 and was completed in 1978; and that, to the best 
of his knowledge, the water main has been used continuously and uninterruptedly 
for  more than  twenty years.  The  Court of Appeals found "Miley's affidavit 
demonstrates his belief that the encroachment permits obtained from Charleston
County covered the installation of the water main as illustrated on the map." Id.
2 See, e.g., Loftis v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 361 S.C. 434, 440-41, 604 S.E.2d 714, 
717 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding respondent established a prescriptive easement under 
claim of right because it believed it had the right to use the property for the power 
lines); Revis v. Barrett, 321 S.C. 206, 210, 467 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(determining plaintiff established a prescriptive easement to the use of an old road
under claim of right based on her belief that she had the right to use the road).  
16 
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The Court of Appeals continued, stating "[t]he fact the claim may have been based 
on a mistake does not negate the claim of right required to establish a prescriptive 
easement." Id. 
As a threshold matter, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing
two methods of proving the third element of a prescriptive easement. We 
acknowledge that this Court's decisions have helped give rise to this error and now 
take this opportunity to clarify the third element of a prescriptive easement.   
While this Court has recently articulated the third element of a prescriptive 
easement as requiring the claimant's use be "adverse or under a claim of right," this 
Court has not always articulated the third element this way. In 1823, the 
Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina determined three things are 
necessary to establish a right by prescription: (1) use and occupation or 
enjoyment; (2) the identity of the thing enjoyed; and (3) that it is adverse to the 
right of  some other person.  Lawton v. Rivers, 13 S.C.L. 445, 451 (2 McCord) 
(1823). In 1917, this Court relied on Lawton and determined:  "To establish a right
by prescription, it is necessary to prove three things: (1) The continued and 
uninterrupted use or enjoyment of the right for the full period of 20 years; (2) the 
identity of the thing enjoyed; (3) that the use or enjoyment was adverse, or under 
claim of right." Williamson, 107 S.C. at 400, 93 S.E. at 15-16 (emphasis added).  
By placing a "comma" after the term "adverse," this Court intended to modify the 
term "adverse," not create another method to establish a claim.3 Accordingly, the 
Williamson is not the only case in which this comma appears after the term
"adverse." For example, in Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 261, 141 S.E. 
375, 387 (1927) (Watts, C.J., dissenting), Poole v. Edwards, 197 S.C. 280, 283, 15 
S.E.2d 349, 350 (1941), and Sanitary & Aseptic Package Co. v. Shealy, 205 S.C. 
198, 203, 31 S.E.2d 253, 255 (1944), this Court cited the Williamson test, with the
comma, verbatim. Approximately eight months before Sanitary, however, this 
Court cited the Williamson test, but, for the first time, without the comma behind 
the term "adverse." See Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 133, 28 S.E.2d 644, 648 
(1944) ("Three things are necessary to establish a right by prescription:  . . . (3) that
the use or enjoyment was adverse or under claim of right."). The Court offered no 
explanation for dropping the comma.  While the comma reappeared after the term
"adverse" in Sanitary eight months after Steele, it is around this time when this 
Court moved away from articulating the third element with a comma following the 
term "adverse." See, e.g., Babb v. Harrison, 220 S.C. 20, 24-25, 66 S.E.2d 457, 
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third element of a prescriptive easement should be interpreted as requiring the
claimant's use be adverse or, in other words, under a claim of right contrary to the
rights of the true property owner. A brief review of additional authority on this 
issue is instructive. 
First, the terms "adverse use" and "claim of right" are, in effect, quite 
similar. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines "adverse use" as "a use  
without license or permission." Black's Law Dictionary 1681 (9th ed. 2009).  
"Claim of right" is defined as: (1) The possession of a piece of property with the
intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner; or (2) A party's manifest  
intention to take over land, regardless of title or right. Black's Law Dictionary 283 
(9th ed. 2009). American Jurisprudence also recognizes that "[u]nder the law of 
prescriptive easements, the essence of a 'hostile' use, which has been referred to
interchangeably in the case law as 'adverse,' 'hostile,' 'nonpermissive,' or 'under a 
claim of right,' is a lack of permission from the true owner." 68 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 3d 239 § 15, at 287 (2002). American Jurisprudence further states:  "Many 
courts have phrased the issue of adverse use in terms of a claim of right. Although 
some have phrased the elements of prescription to include both adverse or hostile 
use and a claim of right, in practice, proof of adverse use and of a claim of right 
merge." 2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 125 § 5, at 144 (1988).
Secondly, it "is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the 
establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also 
be adverse." Bundy, 412 S.C. at 310, 772 S.E.2d at 173; see 2 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts 3d 197 § 6, at 218 (1988) ("Any use of property which is not hostile or 
adverse to the interests or title of the property owner cannot ripen into a
prescriptive right."). Therefore, to the extent that there is a difference between the 
two terms, there still could not be a legitimate claim of right without adverse use.   
458 (1951) ("It has long been recognized that the requirements necessary to 
establishing a right by prescription are: . . . (3) that the use or enjoyment was
adverse or under claim of right." (citing Lawton, Williamson, Poole, Steele, and 
Sanitary & Aseptic Package Co.)). Because this Court offered no explanation for 
dropping the comma, and because, in later cases, this Court relies on decisions in 
which the comma appears, we believe the failure to cite the third element with the
comma behind "adverse" was unintentional. 
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Accordingly, we hold adverse use and claim of right cannot exist as separate 
methods of proving the third element of a prescriptive easement as the two terms 
are, in effect, one and the same. Thus, we overrule those decisions that express a 
contrary conclusion of law. We also take the opportunity to emphasize that a
claimant's belief regarding the permissiveness of his use of property is irrelevant 
when determining the existence of a prescriptive easement.  Instead, courts in this 
state should only determine whether the claimant's use was indeed adverse.  
In sum, we conclude that when analyzing the third element of a prescriptive 
easement, courts in this state should apply the test for adverse use. See
Williamson, 107 S.C. at 400, 93 S.E. at 16 ("[W]hen it appears that claimant has 
enjoyed an easement openly, notoriously, continuously, and uninterruptedly, in 
derogation of another's rights, for the full period of 20 years, the use will be 
presumed to have been adverse."). However, because the "continuous" and 
"uninterrupted" elements for adverse use are already required to establish a 
prescriptive easement, the subtest for "adverse use" only further requires the 
claimant's use be "open" and "notorious." Thus, we believe the test for a
prescriptive easement can be simplified as follows: 
In order to establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must 
identify the thing enjoyed, and show his use has been open, notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted, and contrary to the true property owner's 
rights for a period of twenty years. 
Applying this test to the case at hand, as will be discussed, we find there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether St. John's Water can prove the "open" 
and "notorious" elements of a prescriptive easement; therefore, we conclude the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the master's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of St. John's Water.   
1. Open 
"'Open' generally means that the use is not made in secret or stealthily. It 
may also mean that it is visible or apparent." Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Servitudes) § 2.17(h) (2000). Here, the water main is located underground. Both 
Tract 498 and Tract 135 are heavily wooded and undeveloped. According to
Simmons, the water meter was hidden under bushes when he first discovered it.  
The water main also had not been "blue-flagged" at that time. Considering these 
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conditions, we find there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether St. John's 
Water's use was open. While this finding is sufficient to warrant a reversal of the 
Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the master's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of St. John's Water, we proceed to address the "notorious" element of a
prescriptive easement for the benefit of the parties on remand.
2. Notorious 
"'Notorious' generally means that the use is actually known to the owner, or 
is widely known in the neighborhood." Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Servitudes) § 2.17(h) (2000). Simmons claims he was unaware of the water main 
because he lived on another parcel located further up Kitford Road, which used 
well water. Nevertheless, the master determined that because a majority of the 
area's residents are getting their water out of a spigot, the fact that there is a water 
main being used to supply the water is widely known, or "notorious." We disagree 
with this determination because Simmons' water also came from a spigot, but was 
supplied by a water well. Further, even if it is widely known that a majority of the 
neighborhood's water comes from a water main that does not necessarily mean the
location of the water main is widely known. Or, in other words, it does not 
necessarily mean it is widely known that St. John's Water is using Simmons' 
property for the use of the water main. 
Consequently, we hold there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
St. John's Water has established each element of a prescriptive easement by clear 
and convincing evidence.4 Thus,  we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals'  
Our holding is consistent with other jurisdictions that have considered this issue.  
As articulated in American Law Reports: 
Where the pipes or other conduits as to which easements have been
claimed were buried underground and their presence was not 
physically apparent throughout the prescriptive period, the courts have
generally concluded that there was insufficient notoriety of the user to 
permit prescription to run against the servient estate. This result has 
often been reached where there was an absence of substantial 
evidence that the servient parties had any notice or information of the
existence of the facility and its user. 
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decision affirming the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. John's 
Water and remand this matter for additional proceedings consistent with the test 
for a prescriptive easement as articulated in this opinion.   
B. Berkeley Electric 
1. Express Easements 
Simmons next contends the Court of Appeals erred in determining Berkeley
Electric did not exceed the scope of the express easements. To support his
contention, Simmons relies on language from this Court's opinion in Hill v. 
Carolina Power & Light Co., 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545 (1943). In Hill, we 
stated, "a grant or reservation of an easement in general terms is limited to a use 
which is reasonably necessary and convenient and as little burdensome to the 
servient estate as possible for the use contemplated." Hill, 204 S.C. at 96, 28 
S.E.2d at 549. While Simmons recognizes that the 1972 easement permits 
Berkeley Electric to maintain distribution lines over Tract 498, Simmons asserts 
Berkeley Electric exceeded the scope of the easement by unreasonably extending 
distribution lines over a portion of Tract 498. Specifically, Simmons argues 
Berkeley Electric could have placed its distribution lines in a way that would have 
been less burdensome to the use and enjoyment of his property. We decline to 
reach the merits of this argument.  Because Simmons failed to raise this issue in his 
petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals, we find it unpreserved for our 
review. See Sloan v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 365 S.C. 299, 307-08, 618 S.E.2d 876, 
J. H. Crabb, Annotation, Easement by prescription in artificial drains, pipes, or 
sewers, 55 A.L.R.2d 1144, 1167 (1957 & Supp. 2015); see City of Montgomery v. 
Couturier, 373 So. 2d 625, 628 (Ala. 1979) (affirming the trial court's finding that 
the City of Montgomery did not establish a prescriptive easement to an 
underground pipe because the pipe was hidden under a large hedgerow and 
because water flowed through the pipe only during heavy rains); Holman v. 
Richardson, 76 So. 136, 138 (Miss. 1917) (holding a prescriptive easement was not 
established over underground drain tiles since they were unknown to the property 
owner until three years prior to the start of the litigation and their existence was not 
open and notorious); Maricle v. Hines, 247 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) 
(determining claimant did not establish a prescriptive easement to the use of an 
underground sewer line because he failed to prove his use was "open, notorious 
and adverse").
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880 (2005) (providing that in order for an issue to be preserved for the Supreme 
Court's review, the issue must have been raised in a petition for rehearing before 
the Court of Appeals). 
2. Prescriptive Easement 
Finally, Simmons asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
master's grant of summary judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric because 
Berkeley Electric failed to prove each element of a prescriptive easement by clear 
and convincing evidence. In addition, Simmons argues he presented more than a
scintilla of evidence to survive Berkeley Electric's summary judgment motion.  
Simmons believes that, in finding otherwise, the Court of Appeals improperly 
weighed the evidence instead of deciding whether there was a material dispute of 
fact. We disagree. 
"[T]he determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in 
a law action." Jowers v. Hornsby, 292 S.C. 549, 551, 357 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1987).  
This Court reviews the trier of fact's determination of whether an easement exists 
as an action at law. Id. Therefore, our scope of review is limited to the correction 
of errors of law, and we will not disturb the master's factual findings that have
some evidentiary support. Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 
87, 221 S.E.2d 773, 776 (1976). 
Simmons contends, and Berkeley Electric agrees, that Berkeley Electric 
must show that any distribution lines crossing Tract 135 are covered under a 
prescriptive easement since neither the 1956 easement nor the 1972 easement 
grants Berkeley Electric the right to run distribution lines over Tract 135. To 
support Berkeley Electric's position that any distribution lines crossing Tract 135 
were acquired under a prescriptive easement, Berkeley Electric submitted
affidavits from Thomas Seeney and Richard Frank, one current and one former 
supervisor over Berkeley Electric's operations in the Johns Island District. Both 
Seeney and Frank worked for Berkeley Electric since the late 1970's. Both stated:  
they were familiar with the age, configuration, and characteristics of the 
distribution line located at 3507 Kitford Road; the line is clearly visible from 
Kitford Road; to the best of their recollections, the line had never been moved; the 
power poles for the line have birthmarks of 1984 and 1986; and that they believed 
the line has been in its current configuration since at least 1980. Based on this
testimony, both the master and Court of Appeals determined Berkeley Electric 
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established a prescriptive easement to the distribution line in its current  
configuration. 
We decline to overrule the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision 
affirming the master's grant of summary judgment on this issue. Both Seeney and 
Frank were able to identify the power line, both attested the line had been in its 
current location for at least twenty years without interruption, and that the line was 
visible from Kitford Road. Thus, we conclude Berkeley Electric has presented  
evidence to prove each element of a prescriptive easement.   
Simmons contends he presented enough evidence to contradict the two  
affidavits and survive Berkeley Electric's motion for summary judgment. To 
support his contention, Simmons relies on two plats, two system maps, and an
affidavit. The plats Simmons relies on are of neighboring properties.  A portion of
Simmons' property, however, is illustrated on the plats. That portion does not 
show all of the power lines Simmons contends run across his property. According 
to Simmons, this discrepancy is enough to create a material dispute of fact.  
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Simmons, we disagree. As
discussed, the plats were not created to show Simmons' property, nor do they 
purport to illustrate all of the power lines encumbering the area.  Thus,  we find  
these plats do not create a dispute of material fact.   
Simmons next relies on two system maps Berkeley Electric produced during 
discovery. According to Simmons, these maps show the distribution line in two 
different locations which creates a dispute of material fact as to whether the 
distribution line has been in the same location for over twenty years. We disagree.  
The system maps are not drawn to scale, nor do they identify any property lines.  
Without additional testimony as to what these maps depict, we find these maps do 
not create a dispute of material fact.   
Finally, Simmons relies on his affidavit, which he contends contradicts 
Frank's and Seeney's affidavits by stating he had personal knowledge the 
distribution line was not in the same location in 1980. While Simmons did attest 
that he had personal knowledge the distribution line in question has not been in its 
current location for over twenty years, in support of that statement he references 
and relies on one of the plats discussed above.  He does not state how he personally 
was aware of the power line's location over the years. Therefore, we conclude 
Simmons has not presented evidence which gives rise to a dispute of material fact. 
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Consequently, we hold the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the master's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric.   
IV. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we affirm the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision that 
upheld the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric. We
reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision that upheld the master's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of St. John's Water and remand for additional 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  Acting Justices Jean H. Toal and 
James E. Moore, concur. 
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PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in State v. Witherspoon, Op. No. 2015-UP-556 (S.C. Ct. App. 
filed Dec. 16, 2015). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision.  
At petitioner's trial for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and first-
degree burglary, the trial judge instructed the jury on section 16-3-657 of the South 
Carolina Code, which provides that testimony of the victim need not be 
corroborated in prosecutions for CSC.1  Defense counsel objected to the charge as 
an improper comment on the facts, but was overruled.  Petitioner was convicted of 
both charges and sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for each conviction, to 
be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed.   
After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Witherspoon, this Court 
held, in State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016), that a jury charge 
including the language of section 16-3-657 was confusing and an unconstitutional 
comment on the facts. 2  This Court explained that, "[b]y addressing the veracity of 
a victim's testimony in its instructions, the trial court emphasizes the weight of that 
evidence in the eyes of the jury." Id. The opinion explicitly overruled precedent 
condoning the use of section 16-3-657 as a jury charge, and provided that the 
ruling would be effective for all cases pending on direct appeal.  Id. 
Moreover, given the centrality of the issue of credibility in this case, and the 
absence of other overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, we find the erroneous 
charge instructing the jury that the victim's testimony need not be corroborated was 
prejudicial. 
1 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-657 (2015). 
2 See S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 ("Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but 
shall declare the law."); State v. Jackson, 297 S.C. 523, 526, 377 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989) ("Under 
South Carolina law, it is a general rule that a trial judge should refrain from all comment which 
tends to indicate to the jury his opinion on the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the 
evidence, or the guilt of the accused.").
26
	
 
 
 
REVERSED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  FEW, 
J., not participating. 
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WILLIAMS, J.: In this cross-appeal, Edward D. Sullivan (Appellant), the 
personal representative of Marion Milam Kay's estate (the Estate), contests the 
circuit court's decision to affirm the probate court's order1 reducing Appellant's
compensation as well as denying Appellant's request for reimbursement of certain 
fees and expenses in connection with the settlement of the Estate.  Martha Milam 
Brown and Mary Leona Milam Moses (collectively "Respondents"), Kay's sisters 
and two beneficiaries of the Estate, cross-appeal, arguing the probate court 
improperly (1) awarded Appellant a fee equivalent to 10% of the Estate when 
Appellant acted in bad faith; (2) failed to require Appellant to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees associated with the settling of the Estate; (3) failed to rule on certain 
beneficiaries' prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should 
Respondents prevail on appeal; (4) limited Respondents' counsel's request for 
attorney's fees; and (5) granted Appellant equitable relief when Appellant acted 
with unclean hands. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
This appeal arises out of Appellant's administration of the Estate of Marion Milam
Kay who passed away on May 3, 2007.  In her last will and testament, Kay 
appointed Appellant to serve as her personal representative (PR).  As PR for the 
Estate, Appellant was charged with the responsibility of distributing Kay's assets, 
and in turn, Kay's will granted Appellant "reasonable compensation for the services 
rendered and reimbursement for reasonable expenses." Pursuant to the terms of 
Kay's will, her assets were distributed as follows: Lisbon Presbyterian Church 
received 25%; the Lisbon Presbyterian Cemetery Fund received 25%; the 
Presbyterian Home of South Carolina received 10%; her two step-grandchildren, 
Bart and Martha Heard, each received 10%; and Respondents each received 10%.  
Kay's will also granted her neighbor, Charles Copeland, an eight-month option to 
purchase a one-half undivided interest in an adjoining 330-acre parcel (the Farm) 
1 Pursuant to section 62-1-308(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014), the 
probate court's order was appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the probate 
court in a Form 4 order.  See § 62-1-308(a) ("A person interested in a final order, 
sentence, or decree of a probate court may appeal to the circuit court in the same 
county, subject to the provisions of Section 62-1-303.").  Because Appellant and 
Respondents essentially take issue with the rulings of the probate court, we frame 
their arguments accordingly, acknowledging the procedural posture of this case.   
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at fair market value. The Estate, valued at $513,491, consisted primarily of Kay's 
home (the Home) and the ten acres2 on which the Home was situated, as well as 
the Farm.   
Prior to Appellant submitting a petition for settlement to the probate court, several 
issues arose in the administration of the Estate.  Appellant stated Respondents, who 
owned the other one-half interest in the 330-acre parcel, were "bitterly 
disappointed" upon learning they did not inherit Kay's entire one-half interest in 
the Farm. Respondents claimed Brown was entitled to an additional five acres—as 
promised prior to Kay's death—and Kay did not have the right to devise her 
interest to anyone other than the heirs of W.H. Milam.3  Respondents' claim to a 
portion of the Farm was at odds with the option to purchase afforded to Copeland 
in Kay's will. Further, Appellant discovered that the owners of the Farm granted to 
each other a "right of first refusal" in 1972, which created a potential conflict with 
Copeland's option to purchase the Farm.   
Because Kay bequeathed the Estate to numerous entities with varying interests, 
Appellant stated he had to determine the most equitable means of accommodating 
each beneficiary.  According to Appellant, three of the residual beneficiaries, 
whose interests totaled 70% of the Estate, desired to receive their share of the 
Estate in cash rather than an interest in real estate.  In an effort to sort out the 
competing claims, Appellant hired a surveyor and an appraiser and met several 
times with Copeland about exercising his option to purchase.  
On May 2, 2008, approximately one year after Kay's death, Appellant submitted a 
proposal to Respondents and Copeland, subject to the approval of all the 
beneficiaries and the probate court.  In the proposal, Appellant recommended 
conveying five acres to Brown at no cost, conveying the 46.85 acres that adjoined 
Copeland's land to Copeland at its appraised value, and offering the remainder of 
the Farm to Respondents at the appraised value.  Appellant testified neither Brown 
nor Moses ever responded to this proposal.  After a meeting with all the 
beneficiaries later that summer, Appellant drafted a second proposal and presented 
2 The Home and 6.238 acres are separated from the remaining 3.762 acres (the Lot) 
by a public roadway.
3 Kay, Brown, and Moses were W.H. Milam's daughters.   
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it to Respondents. Appellant stated Respondents again failed to respond or offer a 
counter-proposal, and at that time, Respondents retained counsel.  
After twenty months passed, and without a resolution of the Estate, Appellant filed 
a partition and declaratory judgment action in circuit court on January 1, 2009.  
Appellant stated the purpose of filing this action was to determine the rights of the 
parties—arising out of Copeland's option to purchase, the 1972 right of first 
refusal, and other claims made by Respondents—and to generally clear title to the 
property so the Estate could be settled.  Appellant amended the complaint on 
March 4, 2009, at which time Respondents filed a counterclaim asserting a right to 
five acres. Litigation ensued, and the parties engaged in discovery.  After fifteen 
months, the parties retained a mediator in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 
Just prior to mediation, Appellant reached an agreement with Rowland Milam, a 
relative of Respondents, to purchase the Estate's one-half undivided interest in the 
Farm, the Home, and the Lot.  The Estate was not responsible for any repairs or 
rollback taxes, and the property was sold using a quitclaim deed.  The final 
purchase price was $367,000, approximately 94% of the 2007–2008 appraised 
value. All parties consented to the sale of the property.  Appellant then made the 
final distribution of Kay's personal effects and filed the proposal for distribution 
with the probate court on November 12, 2010.  
Respondents requested a hearing, which took place on February 2, 2011, and 
February 21, 2011. At the hearings, the probate court received testimony and 
evidence from the parties but disallowed the introduction of an affidavit prepared 
by Appellant detailing his administration of the Estate and an affidavit from R. 
David Massey, Esquire, in support of Appellant's request for compensation.  
The court subsequently issued an order, finding Appellant "unnecessarily 
complicated the Estate by insisting on filing a partition action."  The court ruled 
Appellant should not have filed a partition/declaratory judgment action, but rather 
should have deeded out the Estate to the beneficiaries by a deed of distribution 
because it found "no necessity for a sale of the real estate." Further, the probate 
court stated Appellant "unnecessarily complicated the Estate by converting an 
eight-month option to purchase the Estate's one-half interest in its real estate into 
an indefinite right to purchase and by giving the option holder the right to buy only 
a portion of the property contrary to the Will."  
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The probate court then ruled on Appellant's entitlement to fees and commissions, 
finding Appellant's claims for commissions were not adequately documented 
because he "had no method or formula for determining the amount for the four 
draws he gave himself other than by pulling a figure out of the air."  Appellant's 
total draws from the Estate on the date of the hearing amounted to $157,179, or 
18.3% of the Estate's value, which the court found to be far greater than the 
statutory presumption of 5%.  As a result, the court held "the commissions sought 
by [Appellant] [we]re clearly excessive," particularly when Appellant offered no 
alternative for valuing his services.  The court acknowledged Appellant "did an 
excellent job in securing the sales price for the real estate" and had "exemplary 
credentials and good standing in the Bar," but this alone did not automatically 
justify the relief requested. In addition, the probate court found Appellant did not 
act in bad faith.
The probate court approved a prior payment to Appellant's law firm, Collins & 
Lacy, P.C., for $13,499.58 and found the firm was entitled to an additional 
$12,306.80. However, the court questioned the necessity of 204.6 hours of 
paralegal work. The probate court disallowed Appellant's request for attorney's 
fees for Appellant's counsel, noting that—although counsel represented Appellant 
well—it did not believe the Estate should pay these attorney's fees.  Further, the 
probate court denied Appellant's request for costs pertaining to the petition for 
settlement and Appellant's expert witness fees.  The court did, however, award 
attorney's fees to Respondent's counsel in the amount of $19,860, to be paid from
the Estate.
Based on the probate court's findings, it concluded Appellant had a right to retain 
$51,300, or approximately 10% of the Estate's value.  As a result, Appellant was 
required to refund the Estate—within thirty days of the order—all additional 
commissions, totaling $42,475.4  After the probate court denied Appellant's Rule 
59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider, Appellant and Respondents appealed to the 
circuit court. Following a hearing on July 19, 2013, the circuit court issued a Form 
4 order in which it affirmed the order of the probate court and required all parties 
to bear the costs of appeal to the circuit court.  Appellant and Respondents then 
appealed to this court. 
4 The probate court held if Appellant completed the winding up of the Estate, then 
he would be entitled to an additional compensation of $2,500 that could be 
deducted from the amount owed to the Estate.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a final order of the probate court, the circuit court must apply the 
same standard of review that an appellate court would apply on appeal.  In re 
Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 361, 434 S.E.2d 254, 257 (1993).  The standard of review 
applicable to cases originating in the probate court depends upon whether the 
underlying cause of action is at law or in equity.  In re Estate of Hyman, 362 S.C. 
20, 25, 606 S.E.2d 205, 207 (Ct. App. 2004); In re Thames, 344 S.C. 564, 568, 544 
S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2001). 
This appeal stemmed from Appellant's petition for settlement of the Estate, 
including a determination of Appellant's entitlement to commissions, expenses, and
costs; each party's entitlement to attorney's fees; and Respondents' motion to 
remove Appellant as PR of the Estate.  Both parties concede—and we agree—that 
the affirmative relief sought by the parties lies in equity.  See Morris v. Tidewater 
Land & Timber, Inc., 388 S.C. 317, 324, 696 S.E.2d 599, 603 (Ct. App. 2010)
("An action for an accounting sounds in equity."); Dean v. Kilgore, 313 S.C. 257, 
259, 437 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1993) (finding action to remove a personal 
representative of estate was an equitable action).  If a matter is decided by the 
probate court and affirmed by the circuit court, this court applies the two-judge 
rule. Dean, 313 S.C. at 259–60, 437 S.E.2d at 155–56.  When the circuit court 
concurs with the probate court in an equity case, the standard of review for this 
court is whether any evidence reasonably supports the findings of the court below.  
Id. at 260, 437 S.E.2d at 155–56. 
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Appellant's Appeal 
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, arguing the circuit court erred in 
affirming the probate court because the probate court improperly (1) required 
Appellant to refund a portion of his compensation when Appellant acted 
reasonably, his compensation was substantiated by the evidence, and a refund 
would unjustly enrich certain beneficiaries; (2) unjustly enriched one or more 
beneficiaries by returning Appellant's compensation; (3) denied Appellant his due 
process rights because Respondents did not properly request that the probate court 
review his compensation; (4) denied Appellant's request for fees and expenses in 
connection with the hearing to settle the Estate; (5) improperly awarded 
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Respondents' counsel attorney's fees; and (6) denied Appellant's Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, motion to reconsider. We agree in part.  
A. Appellant's Fee 
Appellant first claims the probate court improperly reduced his compensation for 
administering and settling the Estate because he acted reasonably and his actions 
were substantiated by the evidence.  We disagree. 
Pursuant to section 62-3-719(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014),  
Unless otherwise approved by the court for extraordinary 
services, a personal representative shall receive for his 
care in the execution of his duties a sum from the probate 
estate funds not to exceed five percent of the appraised 
value of the personal property of the probate estate plus 
the sales proceeds of real property of the probate estate 
received on sales directed or authorized by will or by 
proper court order, except upon sales to the personal 
representative as purchaser. 
However, "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply in a case where there is a 
contract providing for the compensation to be paid for such services, or where the 
will otherwise directs, or where the personal representative qualified to act before 
June 28, 1984." S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-719(c) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).  
Item V(3) of Kay's will addressed the PR fee schedule and stated, "For its services 
as personal representative, the individual personal representative shall receive 
reasonable compensation for the services rendered and reimbursement for 
reasonable expenses." 
In Appellant's petition for settlement to the probate court, he requested $93,775 for 
commissions already paid and $13,447.05 for additional commissions yet to be 
paid. The probate court concluded compensating Appellant for the amounts 
requested would total 21% of the Estate's value, which was far beyond the 
statutorily mandated 5% pursuant to section 62-3-719(a).  Because Appellant failed 
to provide a legitimate basis for his fees, the probate court concluded a reduction of 
$42,475 was warranted, bringing Appellant's commission to 10% of the Estate's
value. 
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On appeal, Appellant has included all of the invoices, time sheets, affidavits, and 
correspondence in support of his claim that he is entitled to the compensation he 
requested from the probate court.  Appellant also cites to Item VII of Kay's will to 
support his administrative decisions underpinning his fees.  Item VII authorizes the 
PR 
to exercise all powers in the management of [the]
Estate . . . upon such terms and conditions as to [Kay's] 
personal representative may seem best, and to execute 
and deliver any and all instruments and to do all acts 
which [her] personal representative may deem proper or 
necessary to carry out the purposes of this [] will. 
We recognize that Appellant encountered difficulties in administering certain 
assets of the Estate and made efforts to rectify these interests.  While we do not 
take issue with Appellant's belief that he acted reasonably and in the best interests 
of the Estate, we also do not believe the probate court's decision to decrease 
Appellant's compensation based on the value of the Estate and the court's view of 
the evidence is without support.  Accordingly, we find the probate court acted 
properly in establishing a reasonable compensation for Appellant's services as PR 
and affirm the circuit court's decision to uphold the probate court's award of 
compensation to Appellant in the amount of $51,300.    
B. Unjust Enrichment 
Next, Appellant argues the circuit court's decision to require him to return a portion 
of his compensation unjustly enriches certain beneficiaries who requested cash 
from the Estate and have benefitted from the services of Appellant.  We disagree.  
Appellant states "a majority in interest of the residuary beneficiaries (70%) desired 
that the PR liquidate the real estate so that they could receive a cash distribution 
rather than an undivided interest in real estate.  Accordingly[,] the [p]robate 
[c]ourt's ruling unjustly enriches these beneficiaries."  As discussed in 
Respondents' cross-appeal, we do not believe requiring Appellant to return a 
portion of his fees to the Estate would unjustly enrich these beneficiaries because 
these funds are properly part of the Estate's assets. See Dema v. Tenet Physician 
Servs.–Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009) ("A party 
may be unjustly enriched when it has and retains benefits or money which in 
justice and equity belong to another.").  Therefore, Appellant's theory of restitution 
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is inapplicable to the case at hand.  See Ellis v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 294 
S.C. 470, 473, 366 S.E.2d 12, 14–15 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Unjust enrichment is 
usually a prerequisite for enforcement of the doctrine of restitution; if there is no 
basis for unjust enrichment, there is no basis for restitution.").  In addition, we find 
it would be inequitable to punish these beneficiaries under the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment based upon their desire to have cash—which they are rightfully entitled 
to and which Appellant consented to—as opposed to a share in the real estate.  
Consistent with Kay's will, a return of these monies would be divided among these 
beneficiaries in accordance with the distribution scheme provided in her will.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's ruling to affirm the probate court on this 
issue. 
C. Due Process 
Appellant contends the probate court erred in requiring him to return a portion of 
his compensation because Respondents failed to comply with the proper procedure 
for contesting Appellant's entitlement to his compensation, thereby depriving him
of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.  We disagree. 
Section 62-3-721(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) outlines the proper 
procedure for contesting a PR's compensation:
After notice to all interested persons, on petition of an 
interested person or on appropriate motion if 
administration is under Part 5 [sections 62-3-501 et 
seq.], . . . the reasonableness of the compensation 
determined by the personal representative for his own 
services, may be reviewed by the court.  Any person who 
has received excessive compensation from an estate for 
services rendered may be ordered to make appropriate 
refunds. 
Appellant contends Respondents failed to file a formal petition in violation of 
section 62-3-721. Although our review of the record uncovers no formal petition, 
we conclude the parties were aware of the issues that would be brought before the 
probate court at the petition for settlement, including Respondents' disagreement 
with Appellant's compensation.  See Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534, 542, 570 
S.E.2d 565, 569 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Procedural due process mandates that a litigant 
be placed on notice of the issues which the court is to consider."). The following 
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dialogue between the probate court and the parties affirms our conclusion on this 
issue: 
Court: Who's the moving party in this [case]? 
Appellant's Counsel: As I understand it, Ms. Moses and 
Ms. Brown have requested the hearing, your Honor. 
. . . . 
Court: Apparently closing documents were sent out and 
as per statutory right, interested parties have the right to 
demand [a] hearing concerning the closing of the Estate.  
And evidently, [Respondents' counsel], that's what you've 
done? 
Respondents' Counsel: Yes, sir.  
. . . . 
Court: Okay . . . Let me ask you, [Appellant's counsel].
Were all of the beneficiaries under the will noticed of 
today's hearing? 
Appellant's Counsel: Yes they were, your honor. 
. . . . 
Court: [W]hen I've done these hearings when there's been 
a demand, it typically in most cases just makes a little 
more sense, and I think the process goes a little smoother, 
is if the -- because typically, it is a complaint about 
something the PR's done or not done.  So typically it runs 
a little smoother if we start the case off as if you 
[Appellant] are the moving party.  So, if there's not a big 
hang-up with that, that's how I would like to do it. 
Based on the foregoing, we hold any purported defects in notice were waived at the 
hearing when the parties acknowledged the issues before the court and proceeded 
with the hearing. See Strickland v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 274 S.C. 554, 555, 
265 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1980) ("A general appearance constitutes a voluntary 
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submission to the jurisdiction of the court and waives any defects and irregularities 
in the service of process."); Connell v. Connell, 249 S.C. 162, 166–67, 153 S.E.2d 
396, 398–99 (1967) (stating if a defendant, by his appearance, "asks any relief 
which can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of his 
person, then he has made a general appearance . . . and waives any defect in the 
jurisdiction arising either from the want of service on the defendant or from a 
defect therein"). Further, based on the length of the hearing, as well as the exhibits 
and documentation submitted to the probate court, we find Appellant had ample
notice and an opportunity to be heard and, thus, affirm the circuit court's decision 
on this issue. See Blanton, 351 S.C. at 542, 570 S.E.2d at 569 ("Procedural due 
process contemplates notice, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and a fair 
hearing before a legally constituted impartial tribunal."). 
D. Appellant's Counsel's Attorney's Fees and Expenses 
Appellant claims the circuit court erroneously denied his request for his counsel's
attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and certain costs for time and preparation on 
the petition for settlement. We disagree. 
In support of his claim for attorney's fees and expenses, Appellant cites section 62-
3-720 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014), which states, "If any personal 
representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or 
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to 
receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements including 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." 
While we agree that section 62-3-720 affords a PR reimbursement for costs and 
attorney's fees in connection with the administration and protection of the Estate, 
we find the probate court properly determined which fees and costs would be borne 
by the Estate and which would be borne by Appellant.  We concur with the probate 
court's finding that Appellant's counsel's fees primarily stemmed from the contest 
between Appellant and Respondents over the amount of his compensation and, 
thus, were properly assessed against Appellant in his individual capacity.  Further, 
we conclude this statute was intended to cover attorney's fees and expenses in 
connection with prosecuting and defending claims against the Estate, as opposed to 
the situation before the probate court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-715(20) (Supp. 
2014) (providing a PR, "acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, 
may properly . . . prosecute or defend claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for 
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the protection of the estate and of the personal representative in the performance of 
his duties").   
To that end, we find the probate court properly approved the attorney's fees already 
paid to Collins and Lacy in the amount of $13,499.58 and approved of an 
additional $12,306.80 to Collins and Lacy for attorney's fees and costs that were 
incurred as part of Appellant's administration of the Estate.  We agree with the 
probate court that those fees and costs were properly borne by the Estate and find 
that award reasonable given the circumstances and the overall value of the Estate.  
We also note that—unlike sections 62-3-715(20) and -720—section 62-3-721 
makes no provision for the payment of a PR's attorney's fees or expenses 
connected with a proceeding to review the PR's compensation.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-3-721(a) (Supp. 2014) ("After notice to all interested persons, . . . the 
propriety of employment of any person by a personal representative including any 
attorney, auditor, investment advisor, or other specialized agent or assistant, the 
reasonableness of the compensation of any person so employed, or the 
reasonableness of the compensation determined by the personal representative for 
his own services, may be reviewed by the court.  Any person who has received 
excessive compensation from an estate for services rendered may be ordered to 
make appropriate refunds."). 
We also find the probate court properly considered the nature of the testimony and 
the role of other witnesses in choosing which fees to assess against the Estate and 
against Appellant. The probate court denied Appellant's request for expert witness 
fees for an appraiser and consultant, both of whom testified at the hearing.  While 
the probate court required Appellant to pay for the appraiser's and the forestry 
consultant's expert witness fees connected with the hearing, it also required the 
Estate to pay $5,000 for the appraisal of Kay's property and $750 for the forestry 
consultant's work valuing the timber on Kay's property.  We agree the appraisal 
and consultant work were costs directly connected with the valuation of the Estate, 
and as such, were legitimate expenses properly paid out of the Estate's assets.  We 
further concur with the probate court's decision to assess the expert fees against 
Appellant as their work product and valuations were not contested issues at the 
hearing. Based on the foregoing, we uphold the circuit court's decision to affirm
the probate court on this issue.
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E. Respondents' Counsel's Attorney's Fees 
Appellant contests the probate court's decision to award Respondents' counsel 
attorney's fees based on the common fund doctrine.  We agree. 
"The common fund doctrine allows a court in its equitable jurisdiction to award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a party who, at his own expense, successfully 
maintains a suit for the creation, recovery, preservation, or increase of a common 
fund or common property." Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 452, 658 S.E.2d 320, 
329 (2008) (citing Johnson v. Williams, 196 S.C. 528, 531, 14 S.E.2d 21, 23 
(1941)). "Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to the common fund doctrine come
directly out of the common fund created or preserved."  Id. (citation omitted).  The
rationale for awarding attorneys' fees in this manner is based on the principle that 
"one who preserves or protects a common fund works for others as well as for 
himself, and the others so benefited should bear their just share of the expenses." 
Id. (citation omitted).  
However, the allowance of attorney's fees out of a common fund is subject to abuse 
and is only permitted in exceptional cases when required to promote justice. 
Johnson, 196 S.C. at 532, 14 S.E.2d at 23.  Although the attorney's services might 
have benefitted all parties, fees cannot be awarded when the interests of the parties 
are adverse. Bedford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 203 S.C. 507, 515, 28 
S.E.2d 405, 407 (1943). Before an attorney may be compensated out of a common 
fund, a contract of employment must exist, whether express or implied in law, 
between the attorney and all parties with an interest in the fund. Johnson, 196 S.C. 
at 532–33, 14 S.E.2d at 23. 
Citing to the common fund doctrine, the probate court awarded Respondents 
attorney's fees and held, "Equity requires that all heirs pay for the work of 
Defendants' attorney[] because his work preserved and protected a common fund[] 
not just for the benefit of Defendants, but for all heirs."  We find the probate court 
improperly applied this doctrine.   
Respondents' decision to hire counsel was based upon their disagreement with the 
division of the Estate and the amount of Appellant's compensation.  Because the 
common fund doctrine requires all interested parties to have the same interests, we 
do not believe the probate court should have required the Estate to pay for 
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Respondents' attorney's fees. Several beneficiaries were in favor of selling the real 
estate as opposed to an in-kind distribution.  Specifically, Penelope Arnold, the 
director of the Presbyterian Home of South Carolina's charitable foundation, 
testified "[the Presbyterian Home] do[es] not have the wherewithal financially to 
pay property taxes, to keep the land up, which we would be responsible for doing 
or paying someone to do that.  And so the preference is always to sell real estate 
and receive the proceeds." Arnold further stated that, at a prior meeting with all 
the beneficiaries to resolve issues with the Estate's division, she and Reverend 
Hunter, of Lisbon Presbyterian Church, were not well-received by Respondents 
based on their preferences over the Estate's division.  Lisbon Presbyterian Church 
also preferred to receive its 25% share of the Estate in cash.
In addition, neither of these beneficiaries took issue with Appellant's compensation 
as did Respondents.  Furthermore, while Respondents' counsel's efforts resulted in 
monies being returned to the Estate, which arguably was for the benefit of all the 
beneficiaries, we find there was no "contract of employment, whether express or 
implied in law, between the attorney and all parties with an interest in the fund."  
Peppertree Resorts, Ltd. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 315 S.C. 36, 41, 431 S.E.2d 598, 
601 (Ct. App. 1993). If all the beneficiaries agreed on the distribution plan and 
took issue with Appellant's compensation, then the common fund doctrine would 
clearly apply. However, based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude 
Respondents—not the Estate—should have borne the cost of Respondents'
representation. As a result, we reverse the circuit court's decision to uphold the 
award of Respondents' counsel's attorney's fees pursuant to the common fund 
doctrine. 
F. Rule 59(e) motion 
Last, Appellant claims the circuit court erred in affirming the probate court's denial 
of Appellant's Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion. We find this argument to be without 
merit. 
In the circuit court's order, it did not rule on whether the probate court properly 
denied Appellant's post-trial Rule 59(e) motion.  Rather, the circuit court—as the 
court of next review—properly addressed the issues that the parties raised to the 
probate court. As a result, we find Appellant's attempt to raise this as legal error to 
be misplaced and without merit.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-8-250 (Supp. 2014) 
(noting "the [c]ourt need not address a point which is manifestly without merit"); 
41 

   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not address a point which is 
manifestly without merit.").
II. Respondents' Cross-Appeal 
Respondents raise the following issues on cross-appeal, claiming the circuit court 
erred in affirming the probate court because the probate court (1) improperly 
awarded Appellant a fee equivalent to 10% of the Estate when Appellant acted in 
bad faith; (2) failed to require Appellant to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
associated with the settling of the Estate; (3) failed to rule on certain beneficiaries' 
prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should Respondents 
prevail on appeal; (4) limited Respondents' counsel's request for attorney's fees; 
and (5) granted Appellant equitable relief when Appellant acted with unclean 
hands. We disagree and address each argument in turn. 
A. Appellant's Fee & Bad Faith 
Respondents first claim the probate court erred in awarding Appellant a 10% 
commission because Appellant acted in bad faith.  We disagree. 
As stated above, we find the probate court properly considered the requisite factors 
and statutory considerations in its decision to award Appellant a fee equivalent to 
10% of the Estate's value. While we recognize section 62-3-719(a) limits a PR's 
fee to 5% of the Estate, we believe the specific circumstances and competing 
interests that otherwise prolonged the settling of "a fairly basic" estate merited an 
imposition of a higher fee.  Further, we find a 10% fee was "reasonable 
compensation" for Appellant's services as stated in Kay's will.
Although Respondents contend Appellant acted in bad faith in the administration 
of the Estate, we find these allegations to be unsubstantiated and a 
mischaracterization by Respondents regarding Appellant's efforts as PR.  
Respondents claim Appellant acted in "violation of his fiduciary duty," "boost[ed] 
his commission," "bilk[ed] the Estate," "loot[ed] the Estate," and generally 
incurred "shocking charges . . . against the Estate."  Although Appellant likely 
could have settled the Estate in a timelier and less costly manner, Appellant 
presented substantiated evidence that he worked diligently over a course of three 
years to accommodate all interested parties.  Further, as noted by the probate court 
in its order and affirmed by the circuit court on appeal, Appellant has "exemplary
credentials and good standing in the Bar."  Respondents' contentions that Appellant 
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acted in bad faith and violated his fiduciary duty to the Estate are not well-founded, 
particularly when Appellant submitted evidence he consulted with legal counsel on 
the proper courses of action in administering the Estate; Appellant attempted to 
meet with all the beneficiaries and create a compromise prior to filing a partition 
action; and Appellant "did an excellent job in securing the sales price for the real 
estate." 
Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant did not improperly exercise his power 
in connection with the Estate and presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate he 
did not breach his duty to the Estate and its beneficiaries.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-3-703(a) (Supp. 2014) (stating a PR has the "duty to settle and distribute 
the estate . . . as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests 
of the estate" and the "successors to the estate").  Accordingly, we affirm the 
circuit court's decision to uphold the probate court's findings on this issue.  
B. PR's Court Costs, Attorney's Fees, and Post-Judgment Interest
Next, Respondents contend the probate court erred in failing to require Appellant 
to pay all costs associated with the proceedings before the probate court, including 
attorney's fees, court costs, and post-judgment interest.  We find this argument 
unpreserved for our review.  
Respondents' argument on this alleged ground of error is conclusory, only stating it
would be "grossly unfair for the heirs to pay for the PR's attempts to increase his 
compensation and further obscure his wrongdoing," and "[i]f the PR chooses to 
violate his duties and maximize his own interests at the expense of the Estate by 
filing an appeal, the heirs, who gain nothing by the appeal, should not suffer 
because of that." We find these two sentences are insufficient to assert legal error 
and decline to address Respondents' argument on this ground.  See Bennett v. 
Investors Title Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578, 599, 635 S.E.2d 649, 660 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting when an appellant fails to cite any supporting authority for a position and 
makes conclusory arguments, the appellant abandons the issue on appeal); Rule 
208(b), SCACR (stating that, for appellate review of an issue to occur, the issue 
must be set forth in a statement of issues and argument). 
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C. Limitation of Recovery 
Respondents argue the probate court erred in failing to rule on certain beneficiaries'
prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should Respondents 
prevail on appeal. We find this issue is not properly before this court.  
Respondents did not raise this issue either to the probate court or to the circuit 
court. Accordingly, we find it is unpreserved for review on appeal.  See Wilder 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that 
an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to 
and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review." (citation 
omitted)).  Further, Respondents cite no legal authority to support their position, 
instead relying on a brief factual argument, which we find insufficient as a matter
of law. See Mulherin–Howell v. Cobb, 362 S.C. 588, 600, 608 S.E.2d 587, 593–94 
(Ct. App. 2005) (finding party abandoned an issue on appeal by failing to cite any 
supporting authority and making only conclusory arguments). 
D. Respondents' Attorney's Fees
Next, Respondents claim the probate court improperly limited their attorney's post-
trial request for additional attorney's fees, citing to the common fund doctrine.  
Because we reverse the probate court's award of attorney's fees to Respondents'
counsel, we decline to address this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding 
appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive). 
E. Unclean Hands 
Last, Respondents claim the probate court erred in granting Appellant equitable 
relief because Appellant acted with unclean hands.  We find this argument is 
unpreserved for our review. 
Neither the probate court nor the circuit court ruled on whether Appellant acted 
with unclean hands. Respondents' failure to raise this issue to either court 
precludes this court's review on appeal.  See Wilke, 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 
733 ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but 
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for 
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appellate review." (citation omitted)); Rock Hill Nat'l Bank v. Honeycutt, 289 S.C. 
98, 104, 344 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating because the theory of 
unclean hands was not pled or raised to the trial judge, it could not be raised on 
appeal).
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the circuit court's decision upholding the probate
court's order as to all issues except Respondent's counsel's attorney's fees. Because
the common fund doctrine does not apply under these facts, we REVERSE the  
award of attorney's fees to Respondents' counsel. Based on our conclusion that
Respondents—not the Estate—must pay for Respondent's counsel's attorney's fees, 
we REMAND the issue of each beneficiary's share of the Estate to the probate 
court for a determination consistent with this court's opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED. 
HUFF, J., concurs. 
FEW, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I concur with the result 
reached by the majority in all but two respects.  First, I would reverse the decision 
to deny Sullivan's request for attorney's fees and expenses for the petition for 
settlement.  In my view, the probate judge's denial of Sullivan's request for fees 
and expenses was driven by his disagreement with Sullivan's decision to file a 
partition action and ultimately sell the estate's interest in the real estate.  Sullivan 
had the right to partition the land pursuant to Kay's will and the probate code and, 
thus, it was within his discretion to do so.  Additionally, as the probate court found 
in its order and the majority explains in Part II. A of its opinion, Sullivan did not 
act in bad faith during his administration of the estate.  
Moreover, the probate code required Sullivan to file a petition for settlement.  See
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-1001(a)(3) (Supp. 2015) (requiring a personal 
representative to file "an application for settlement of the estate to consider the 
final accounting or approve an accounting and distribution and adjudicate the final
settlement and distribution of the estate").  Moses and Brown requested the hearing 
on Sullivan's petition for settlement, and at the hearing, Sullivan defended his 
decision to seek a partition and sell the real estate.  Because the probate code 
provides a personal representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in 
good faith" is "entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and 
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disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred," S.C. Code Ann. § 62-
3-720 (Supp. 2015), and Sullivan filed the petition for settlement and appeared at 
the hearing in good faith, I would find he is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees 
and expenses. 
Second, I question whether the standard of review in an appeal from an equity case 
is any different simply because two judges have made the same factual 
determination.  The first time the phrase "two-judge rule" was used in this State 
was in Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 172, 232 S.E.2d 504, 510 (1977).  
Describing the substance of the rule, the Nienow Court stated "concurrent findings 
of fact by the trial judge and master are binding on this Court unless they are 
without evidentiary support or against the clear preponderance of the evidence."  
268 S.C. at 170, 232 S.E.2d at 509.  That description differs from the ordinary 
standard of reviewing equity cases only by the use of the word "clear."  See Lewis 
v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 390-91, 709 S.E.2d 650, 654-55 (2011) (explaining that in 
equity appeals there is "a burden on an appellant to satisfy the appellate court that 
the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial court").  The
use of the word "clear" in Nienow does not distinguish the rule recited there from 
the rule applied in Lewis. As former Chief Justice Toal noted in her concurrence in 
Lewis, "our standard of review in a particular case depends on the nature of the 
underlying action and has little to do with the semantics concerning the method by 
which the case reaches the Court."  392 S.C. at 398, 709 S.E.2d at 658 (Toal, C.J., 
concurring). I would apply the standard of review from Lewis, and I would reach 
the same result as the majority on all issues except Sullivan's request for attorney's 
fees and expenses for the petition for settlement.   
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WILLIAMS, J.:  Tzvetelina Miteva (Wife) appeals the family court's divorce 
decree, arguing the family court erred in: (1) denying her request for a divorce on 
the ground of Nicholas Robinson's (Husband) habitual drunkenness; (2) identifying 
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and apportioning the marital estate on a fifty-fifty basis; and (3) requiring her to 
pay Husband's attorney's fees.  We affirm as modified.  
 
 
FACTS 
 
Wife and Husband married on November 25, 2007.  After almost four years of 
marriage, Wife filed for divorce on August 30, 2011.  The parties had no children 
during the marriage, but Wife had a minor child and Husband had two adult 
children from their respective prior marriages.  In Wife's complaint, she sought a 
divorce on the ground of Husband's habitual drunkenness and requested equitable 
division of the marital assets and attorney's fees.  Husband answered and 
counterclaimed, denying Wife's allegations and seeking equitable division of the 
marital estate and attorney's fees. 
 
The family court held a final hearing on May 8 and 9, 2013.  At the final hearing, 
Husband and Wife submitted evidence and testimony to substantiate their claims to 
the family court, specifically addressing each party's claim to several properties 
that were bought, improved, and sold during their marriage.  The family court 
subsequently issued its final order and denied Wife a divorce on the ground of 
habitual drunkenness. Because Wife failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she was entitled to a divorce on this ground, the family court granted 
both parties a divorce on the ground of one-year's separation.   
 
The family court also held the following: (1) the parties transmuted certain 
properties that were bought and sold during the marriage; (2) Husband's retirement 
account and mobile homes were nonmarital property; and (3) the family court did 
not have jurisdiction to divide real property that was not titled in the name of either 
party. The family court concluded Wife's removal of $115,521 from marital funds 
was financial misconduct and assigned that amount to Wife.  After considering the 
factors for apportioning marital property as required by section 20-3-620(B) of the 
South Carolina Code (2014), the family court apportioned 50% of the marital 
estate to Wife and 50% to Husband.  Finally, the family court required Wife to pay 
all of Husband's attorney's fees, which totaled $27,561.29. Wife submitted a 
motion to alter or amend the family court's ruling, which the family court denied.  
This appeal followed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW  
"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de 
novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).  
"[T]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the 
preponderance of the evidence."  Epperly v. Epperly, 312 S.C. 411, 414, 440 
S.E.2d 884, 885 (1994). Although the appellate court retains the authority to make 
its own findings of fact, "we recognize the superior position of the family 
court . . . in making credibility determinations."  Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 
709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011). Therefore, the appellant bears the burden of 
convincing this court that the family court committed error or the preponderance of 
evidence is against the court's findings.  Id. 
I. HABITUAL DRUNKENESS 
Wife argues the family court erred in denying her request for a divorce on the 
ground of habitual drunkenness.  We disagree. 
"Section 20-3-10(4) of the South Carolina Code . . . provides that habitual 
drunkenness is grounds for divorce.  Habitual drunkenness is the fixed habit of 
frequently getting drunk; it does not necessarily imply continual drunkenness."  
Lee v. Lee, 282 S.C. 76, 78‒79, 316 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ct. App. 1984).  "In order to 
prove habitual drunkenness, there must be a showing that the abuse of alcohol 
caused the breakdown of the marriage and that such abuse existed at or near the 
time of filing for divorce."  Epperly, 312 S.C. at 414, 440 S.E.2d at 885. 
Wife testified Husband was unemployed for half of the marriage.  Moreover, Wife 
claimed, while Husband was unemployed, he would get drunk every day and abuse 
prescription medication. Wife testified Husband's alcohol consumption and drug 
use worsened throughout the marriage and caused the marriage to deteriorate.   
Wife introduced four police reports to support her testimony.  A police report dated 
April 17, 2010, indicated Wife called police but reported everything was "10-4."  
On December 5, 2010, Wife again called police and said "Husband ha[d] gone 
crazy," but she then stated she did not need help.  On April 9, 2011, police 
responded to a call from Wife, but when they arrived, Wife claimed she was fine 
and would not provide a reason for calling.  At the hearing, Wife stated Husband 
hid in the basement and instructed her to tell police everything was okay.  In the 
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final police report, dated October 21, 2012, Wife reported Husband walked around 
their house naked in front of her daughter.  However, on cross-examination, Wife 
acknowledged she separated from Husband in 2011, but she waited until October 
2012 to file the final police report.  Wife claimed she did not know the process for 
making an allegation, but she then conceded she had contacted police on prior 
occasions. Additionally, Wife admitted that, on April 30, 2009, she wrote a note 
indicating if something happened to her, she would like her daughter to stay with 
Husband. 
Zlatka Miteva, Wife's mother, testified she lived in Bulgaria, but stayed with the 
parties for a few months every year.  She stated Husband had a problem with 
alcohol before the parties married.  Zlatka claimed Husband got drunk every day 
and took prescription medication, which caused him to shake and become 
aggressive.
Several other witnesses testified regarding Husband's alcohol consumption.
Husband's ex-wife, Nasrin Robinson, and one of Husband's daughters, Sophie 
Robinson, testified they had observed Husband consume alcohol, but they had 
never seen him drunk.  Additionally, both claimed they had never seen Husband 
become angry when drinking.  Nasrin admitted she only saw Husband several 
times a year. Nasrin and Sophie both acknowledged Husband paid for Sophie's 
undergraduate and graduate school tuition.  Don Pierman, Husband's friend, 
testified he had known Husband for twenty-five years, but he had never seen him 
drunk. However, Pierman admitted he had only seen Husband once a year during 
the past few years. 
Husband also testified at the final hearing about his alcohol consumption.  
Husband admitted he drank alcohol but denied drinking in excess or using drugs.  
Moreover, Husband asserted he was not intoxicated when police came to the 
parties' home.  Husband testified he was employed as a system auditor when the 
parties married, and he sometimes worked from home during the marriage.  He 
claimed he was laid off because of a change in management.  According to 
Husband, Wife's daughter saw him naked once when walking from his bedroom to 
his bathroom; however, he stated he was not expecting to see her.   
After considering the foregoing testimony, the family court concluded Wife failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to a divorce on 
the ground of Husband's habitual drunkenness.  The family court stated Nasrin and 
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Sophie might not be disinterested witnesses because of Husband's support 
obligations but found Pierman's testimony should be given more weight.  
Additionally, the family court found Husband's appearance and professional 
accomplishments suggested he was a person of considerable self-control.  The 
family court noted there was no mention of alcohol in any of the police reports and 
determined the incident report regarding nudity in the presence of Wife's daughter 
was generated after the separation to create corroboration for the grounds for 
divorce when no other significant corroboration existed.  Furthermore, the family 
court ascertained Wife's letter, stating she wished for her daughter to stay with 
Husband, was written half-way through the marriage and occurred during 
Husband's unemployment when, according to Wife and Zaltka, Husband's drinking 
was the most evident. 
Aware of our de novo standard of review, we concur with the family court's 
decision on this issue. Because the parties presented conflicting evidence about the 
nature of Husband's drinking, we find the family court was in the best position to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses.  See Bodkin v. Bodkin 388 S.C. 203, 
214, 694 S.E.2d 230, 236 (Ct. App. 2010) (affirming the family court's finding that 
husband failed to establish wife's habitual drunkenness when parties presented 
conflicting evidence as to how much wife drank and whether it was a problem 
because "the family court was in the better position to see the witnesses and judge 
their credibility"). The family court found Pierman's testimony that Husband did 
not drink in excess was credible.  Similarly, it found Husband's appearance and 
professional accomplishments were indicative of self-control.  Based upon these 
findings as well as the fact that none of the police reports mentioned alcohol, we 
affirm the family court's finding that Wife did not meet her burden of proof.  
Furthermore, because the granting of a divorce to Wife on the ground of habitual 
drunkenness would not have dissolved the marriage any more completely, we find 
Wife suffered no prejudice by the family court's ruling.  See Mick-Skaggs v. 
Skaggs, 411 S.C. 94, 101–02, 766 S.E.2d 870, 873‒74 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding the 
family court acted within its discretion in awarding parties a no-fault divorce, even 
though wife presented sufficient evidence to establish a fault-based ground for 
divorce). Thus, we affirm the family court's decision on this issue.   
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II.		 IDENTIFICATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE 
Wife argues the family court erred in its identification and apportionment of the 
marital estate. We disagree. 
A.	  Identification of the Marital Estate 
Marital property consists of "all real and personal property which has been 
acquired by the parties during the marriage and which is owned as of the date of 
filing or commencement of marital litigation as provided in [s]ection 20-3-620 
regardless of how legal title is held . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A) (2014).  
Property acquired prior to the marriage and property acquired by inheritance, 
devise, bequest, or gift from a party other than the spouse is nonmarital property.  
Id.  "The [family] court does not have jurisdiction or authority to apportion 
nonmarital property."  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) (2014).   
Property that is nonmarital when acquired may be 
transmuted into marital property if it becomes so 
commingled with marital property that it is no longer 
traceable, is titled jointly, or is used by the parties in 
support of the marriage or in some other way that 
establishes the parties' intent to make it marital property. 
Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 384, 743 S.E.2d 734, 740 (2013).  "The spouse 
claiming transmutation must produce objective evidence showing that, during the 
marriage, the parties themselves regarded the property as the common property of 
the marriage." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 345 S.C. 88, 98, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537 (Ct. App. 
2001). "As a general rule, transmutation is a matter of intent to be gleaned from 
the facts of each case."  Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 295, 372 S.E.2d 107, 
110 (Ct. App. 1988). 
1.	  Mobile Homes
Wife first contends the family court erred in classifying several mobile homes as 
nonmarital property. We disagree. 
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In support of her position, Wife claimed she gave Husband $50,000 in cash and 
$52,500 in checks to pay off credit card debt he incurred prior to the marriage 
when he purchased several mobile homes.  However, when questioned, Wife 
acknowledged the checks paid to Husband during the marriage only totaled 
$21,000. Conversely, Husband asserted he purchased the mobile homes in 2006 
with money from stocks and did not have any outstanding credit card debt when 
the parties married.  The family court determined the mobile homes were 
purchased by Husband prior to the marriage with cash from the sale of stock, and 
there was no indication that Husband intended to transmute them into marital 
property. The family court noted Wife did not provide credit card statements or 
payments made directly to pay off credit cards to support her allegation.   
We agree with the family court and find Wife failed to prove the parties intended 
to transmute the mobile homes into marital property.  After reviewing the record, 
we conclude Wife did not present any evidence specifically proving she paid off 
Husband's credit card debt associated with the mobile homes and did not prove the 
parties regarded the mobile homes as common properties of the marriage.  See 
Jenkins, 345 S.C. at 98, 545 S.E.2d at 537 ("The spouse claiming transmutation 
must produce objective evidence showing that, during the marriage, the parties 
themselves regarded the property as the common property of the marriage."); see 
also Murray v. Murray, 312 S.C. 154, 158, 439 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(finding wife failed to produce objective evidence showing that real estate 
purchased by husband prior to the marriage was regarded by the parties as common 
property during the marriage). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's decision 
on this issue. 
2. Ferguson Meadow and Montibello Drive  
Wife also claims the family court erred in concluding Ferguson Meadow and 
Montibello Drive were marital properties.  We disagree.  
Wife stated she purchased all the properties that were bought and sold during the 
marriage with money she received from her family in Bulgaria and $200,000 
Husband repaid her by taking out a home equity line of credit (HELOC).  Wife 
asserted she loaned Husband over $200,000 during the marriage to pay off his 
credit card debt; to pay the mortgage on the home he purchased before the parties'
marriage; and to fulfill obligations he owed from his previous separation 
agreement.  Wife claimed she initially purchased a home on Ferguson Meadow in 
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York, South Carolina (Ferguson Meadow), and another property located in Rock 
Hill, South Carolina. Wife stated she sold the property located in Rock Hill and 
used the proceeds to remodel another property she purchased in Lake Wylie, South 
Carolina, which she subsequently sold.  Wife claimed she continued to buy and sell 
various properties in South Carolina and North Carolina using proceeds from prior 
sales, including a home on Montibello Drive in Charlotte, North Carolina 
(Montibello Drive). 
According to Wife, Husband had no involvement with the purchased properties; 
however, she conceded: (1) Husband's name was listed as the purchaser on the 
Lake Wylie property settlement statement; (2) Husband and Wife's names were
listed as the purchasers on the settlement statement of Ferguson Meadow; and (3) 
Husband's name was listed as the landlord on the lease for Ferguson Meadow.
When Husband emailed Wife to inquire about the location of the HELOC money, 
Wife acknowledged responding that "the $200K [was] in Montibell[o]." 
William Brice—the closing attorney for four of the properties—testified Wife told 
him the money for the properties came from her family and specified the properties 
were investments for her daughter.  Brice said most of the properties were 
purchased in Wife's name, but one might have been titled in Husband's name.   
Conversely, Husband testified he and Wife began jointly investing in real estate for
their mutual benefit.  Husband claimed Nadejda and Pavel Bolt worked with the 
parties to buy, renovate, and resell the acquired properties.  In this venture, 
Husband stated he researched properties; Nadejda acted as their real estate agent; 
he and Wife financed the purchases; and then he and Pavel renovated the 
properties. Husband introduced emails to substantiate their professional 
relationship. Husband also introduced his email correspondence with York County 
Planning and Development Services regarding property inspections and permits.   
Husband claimed he found the first property, and Wife financed the purchase price.  
He testified he had the first property painted; installed a refrigerator, microwave, 
and range; and "[brought] it up to spec[]."  Husband also stated he found a tenant 
and managed the first property before it was sold.  According to Husband, he then 
found Ferguson Meadow, and Wife also financed this purchase price.  Husband 
explained he rented and managed Ferguson Meadow, and in support of his claim, 
he introduced a lease on which he was listed as the landlord.  Husband testified he 
then found the Lake Wylie property and financed the $216,000 purchase price by 
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taking out a HELOC. Husband claimed he and Pavel performed extensive 
remodeling before selling this property.  He recalled Nadejda found the next 
property in Fort Mill. According to Husband, the parties sold the Fort Mill 
property, and the proceeds went to purchase another property in Waxhaw, North 
Carolina. Husband admitted he did not perform any physical labor on the Waxhaw 
property. The parties used the proceeds of the Waxhaw property to purchase 
Montibello Drive, which Wife managed and rented before residing there.  
The family court found Ferguson Meadow was transmuted into marital property 
because it was purchased by the parties in the joint enterprise of buying and selling 
distressed properties.  Additionally, the family court concluded Montibello Drive 
was marital property because it was financed with the proceeds generated from a 
number of real estate sales by Husband and Wife and by Husband's HELOC.  
We agree that Montibello Drive was marital property and Ferguson Meadow was 
transmuted into marital property.  Along with Husband's testimony that he and 
Wife jointly invested in real estate for their mutual benefit, Husband also 
introduced the following: (1) emails sent between him and York County Planning 
and Development Services regarding housing inspections and permits; (2) emails 
demonstrating a work relationship between Husband, Wife, Pavel, and Nadejda; 
and (3) a Ferguson Meadow lease with Husband's name listed as the landlord.  
Husband also introduced multiple emails demanding Wife tell him the location of 
the money from his HELOC, and Wife's response that "the 200K are in 
Montibello." We find Husband's persistent inquiries and Wife's response tend to 
establish that the HELOC was not meant to repay Wife, but was a source of capital 
for the parties' real estate investments.  Although the parties agree that Wife 
financed Ferguson Meadow, we find Husband put forth evidence that he and Wife 
regarded the purchased real estate as common property of the marriage.  See 
Jenkins, 345 S.C. at 98, 545 S.E.2d at 537 ("The spouse claiming transmutation 
must produce objective evidence showing that, during the marriage, the parties 
themselves regarded the property as the common property of the marriage.").  
Accordingly, we affirm the family court's finding that Ferguson Meadow and 
Montibello Drive were marital property. 
B.      Apportionment of the Marital Estate 
Next, Wife asserts the family court failed to consider the evidence and 
appropriately apply the equitable apportionment factors when it divided the marital 
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estate. Specifically, Wife asserts: (1) she contributed significantly more to the 
acquisition of property; (2) Husband's income was higher; (3) she did not commit 
financial misconduct; (4) Husband received significant nonmarital property; (5) 
Husband had a vested retirement account while Wife had none; and (6) the parties 
were not awarded homes of equal value.  We disagree.   
"The apportionment of marital property is within the discretion of the family court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."  Wooten v. 
Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 542, 615 S.E.2d 98, 103 (2005).  Section 20-3-620(B) of the 
South Carolina Code (2014) provides fifteen factors the family court must consider 
in apportioning marital property and affords the family court the discretion to 
weigh each factor as it finds appropriate.  "On appeal, this court looks to the 
overall fairness of the apportionment, and it is irrelevant that this court might have 
weighed specific factors differently than the family court."  Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 
206, 213‒14, 634 S.E.2d 51, 55 (Ct. App. 2006).   
Wife testified at the hearing regarding the parties' assets at the time of the
marriage. She indicated she had $38,230.76 in the bank; $50,000 or $60,000 in 
cash from family in Bulgaria; and additional money wired from her mother in 
Bulgaria. Wife testified Husband did not have any liquid assets, but he owned a 
house on Messina Road in Clover, South Carolina (Messina Road), which had a 
mortgage of over $200,000. Additionally, Wife contended Husband was
unemployed for half of the marriage, and she paid Messina Road's mortgage when 
he was unemployed.  
According to Wife, over the course of the parties' marriage, she gave Husband over 
$200,000. She stated she regularly received money from her family in Bulgaria, 
claiming she received around $50,000 prior to the marriage and over $200,000 
during the marriage. According to Wife, the funds came from her parents, rental 
income from Wife's investment properties, and her daughter's father.  Wife claimed 
family and friends visiting from Bulgaria would bring money into the United 
States in $10,000 increments. She stated she expected Husband to repay her the 
money she gave him during their marriage, but she could not provide the exact 
amount of money he owed her.  Wife also admitted that when she responded to an 
interrogatory asking her to list any loans, gifts, advances, or subsidies from family 
members that she had received in the past five years, she only listed $57,000.  
Zlatka also testified she gave Wife around $230,000 during the marriage.
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Wife claimed she invested over $100,000 in a solar panel company in June 2011, 
but she lost the money because the business was unsuccessful.  She stated one of
the partners in the solar panel company previously performed work on Montibello 
Drive. According to Wife, the partner in the solar panel company forgave $50,000 
or $60,000 that was owed to him for his work on Montibello Drive after she lost 
her investment.
Husband claimed he and Wife kept their finances separate because they had 
preexisting properties and obligations.  He testified Wife never paid Messina 
Road's mortgage.  Husband stated he was terminated from his job in January 2009 
because of a change in management, and he received $1,200 per month in 
unemployment benefits for the next fourteen months.  During this time, he became 
an independent consultant and also began researching the real estate market.  
According to Husband, he used savings and rental income from his mobile homes 
to financially support his daughter and pay Messina Road's mortgage, taxes, and 
utilities. 
In response to Wife's claim that she invested $100,000 in a solar panel company in 
June 2011, Husband testified he believed Wife withdrew $115,000 and gave the 
money to Pavel to purchase a home on Caldwell Rush Circle in Cornelius, North 
Carolina (Caldwell Rush) under the trade name, Powerhightech.  He stated Wife 
told him about another property prior to June 2011, and he expressed concerns 
about whether the investment would be profitable.  Husband introduced a deed 
dated June 22, 2011, indicating: (1) Powerhightech was the purchaser of Caldwell 
Rush; (2) Pavel signed the deed as President of Powerhightech, Inc.; and (3) the 
purchase price was $114,486.  He stated Wife began excluding him from 
transactions and decision-making, and he introduced emails he sent to Wife, 
Nadejda, and Pavel expressing his frustration and asking where his HELOC money 
was located. Husband claimed he had not seen any of the proceeds from the 
properties.
The family court noted that as of the final hearing, Husband's gross monthly 
income was $15,450 and Wife's gross monthly income was $11,000.  After 
receiving the foregoing evidence and testimony, the family court considered all the 
applicable factors provided in section 20-3-620(B) and determined the marital 
property should be divided evenly between Wife and Husband.   
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After reviewing the record, we find the family court's apportionment was fair, and 
it did not abuse its discretion by apportioning 50% of the marital estate to Wife and
50% to Husband. See Wooten, 364 S.C. at 542, 615 S.E.2d at 103 ("The 
apportionment of marital property is within the discretion of the family court and 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.").  In response to 
Wife's allegation of error, we find Wife failed to provide satisfactory evidence that
she contributed $200,000 of her own funds toward the acquisition of marital 
property. Wife did not present any bank statements to verify the source of her 
funds, with the exception of two withdrawals of $56,149 and $55,342, which were 
used to purchase the parties' two initial properties.  Because we concur with the 
family court's finding that these two properties were transmuted into marital 
property, we find the funds used to purchase those properties also to be marital.  
Additionally, we find the family court's conclusion that Wife was in a better 
financial position than Husband was not an abuse of discretion.  Although 
Husband's income was higher than Wife's on the date of the final hearing, we 
concur with the family court's finding that Wife had no debt, possessed significant 
nonmarital properties, and had more time before retirement to acquire assets.   
As to the family court's finding that Wife committed marital misconduct regarding 
the parties' finances, we, too, question whether Wife invested $115,000—almost 
the exact amount invested to acquire Caldwell Rush—in a solar panel company 
owned by the same person who worked for her flipping properties.  We hold the 
family court thoroughly considered the parties' nonmarital assets, including 
Husband's 401K retirement account, and available evidence on the income from 
the parties' nonmarital properties.  Finally, as to Wife's argument that the houses 
awarded to each party were not of equal value, we find the family court's equitable 
apportionment worksheet accounted for the differing home values in its fifty-fifty 
division of the marital assets.  Therefore, we find the fifty-fifty division as a whole 
was fair. Doe, 370 S.C. at 213‒14, 634 S.E.2d at 55 ("On appeal, this court looks 
to the overall fairness of the apportionment, and it is irrelevant that this court might 
have weighed specific factors differently than the family court.").  Accordingly, we 
affirm the family court's decision on this issue.   
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Last, Wife argues the family court erred in requiring her to pay all of Husband's 
attorney's fees. We agree and accordingly modify the family court's order. 
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"The award of attorney's fees in a domestic action rests within the sound discretion 
of the family court." Reiss v. Reiss, 392 S.C. 198, 210, 708 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Ct. 
App. 2011). When deciding whether to award attorney's fees, the family court 
must consider: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2)
beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial 
conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of 
living." E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476‒77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992).  
After finding an award is appropriate, the family court should next consider the 
amount of attorney's fees to award.  Farmer v. Farmer, 388 S.C. 50, 57, 694 
S.E.2d 47, 51 (Ct. App. 2010). In determining reasonable attorney's fees, the 
family court should consider: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) 
the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) 
contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary 
legal fees for similar services."  Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 
S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991). "Ordinarily, unless otherwise provided for by contract or 
statute, the responsibility of paying attorney['s] fees falls upon the party 
contracting for the services." Anderson v. Tolbert, 322 S.C. 543, 545, 473 S.E.2d 
456, 457 (Ct. App. 1996).
In its final order, the family court found Husband was entitled to recover his 
attorney's fees from Wife.  Citing to E.D.M., the family court determined: (1) both 
parties had the ability to pay their own attorney's fees, but Husband's debt "may" 
limit his ability; (2) Husband's attorney obtained more beneficial results, and 
Wife's position toward equitable division was unreasonable; (3) the parties would 
be in relatively equal financial conditions after the equitable division; and (4) 
Wife's standard of living would not be significantly affected by her payment of 
Husband's fee, but Husband's standard of living "could be" reduced if he had to pay 
his own fees. The family court then reviewed the Glasscock factors and 
determined Wife should pay all $27,561.29 of Husband's attorney's fees.   
Reviewing the record de novo, we find a modification of the attorney's fees award 
is warranted. Although we are mindful of the family court's discretion in awarding 
attorney's fees, we conclude a more equitable apportionment is to require Wife to 
pay a portion—as opposed to the entirety—of Husband's attorney's fees.  In 
modifying the family court's order, we emphasize that three of the four E.D.M. 
factors to consider in whether to award attorney's fees pertain to the financial 
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positions of the parties.1 See E.D.M., 307 S.C. at 476–77, 415 S.E.2d at 816 ("In 
determining whether an attorney's fee should be awarded, the following factors 
should be considered: (1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) 
beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial 
conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living.")  
Taking this into consideration, we note the financial equities between the parties.  
Husband and Wife both have the ability to pay their own attorney's fees, are in 
relatively equal financial positions following the family court's equitable 
distribution award, and can maintain their current standard of living if held 
responsible for their own attorney's fees.  Further, although Husband was 
unemployed for a portion of the parties' marriage, his monthly income exceeded 
that of Wife by the date of the final hearing.  We are cognizant of the family court's 
findings that Wife had no debt, possessed significant nonmarital properties, and 
had more time before retirement to acquire assets.  However, we do not believe 
Wife's lack of debt should be used against her in the assessment of attorney's fees, 
particularly considering Husband's income and earning potential.   
We recognize Husband achieved greater beneficial results than Wife.  Husband 
successfully established the mobile home and his retirement account were 
nonmarital property and several pieces of real estate acquired during the marriage 
were marital property, despite Wife's claims they were acquired with her 
nonmarital funds.  However, Wife successfully argued Messina Road was 
transmuted into marital property.  Although we acknowledge Husband prevailed 
on more issues than Wife, the beneficial results factor is only one of several factors 
to consider in deciding whether or not to award attorney's fees.  See Wooten v. 
Wooten, 358 S.C. 54, 65, 594 S.E.2d 854, 860 (Ct. App. 2003), aff'd in relevant 
part, rev'd in part, 364 S.C. 532, 615 S.E.2d 98 (2005) (holding "[e]ven though 
Husband prevailed on two of the equitable division issues in this appeal, the 
beneficial results obtained are only one of several factors to be considered by the 
family court in deciding whether or not to award attorney's fees").  Further, 
1 Wife does not appeal the reasonableness of Husband's attorney's fees.  
Accordingly, we need not consider the factors enunciated in Glasscock pertaining 
to the reasonableness of attorney's fees.  See Simpson v. Simpson, 377 S.C. 527, 
539, 660 S.E.2d 278, 285 (Ct. App. 2008) (addressing only whether the wife was 
entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to E.D.M. and declining to address the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees when the husband only appealed the family 
court's ruling requiring him to pay half of the wife's attorney's fees).
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although the family court declined to grant Wife a fault-based divorce, we find its 
decision to grant the parties a no-fault divorce should not work a detriment to Wife 
in the beneficial results analysis as neither ground would have dissolved the 
marriage any more completely.  See Mick-Skaggs, 411 S.C. at 105, 766 S.E.2d at 
876 (finding family court's decision to grant parties a no-fault divorce, despite the 
wife's claims of the husband's adultery, was neither beneficial nor harmful to either 
party in an E.D.M. analysis of whether to award attorney's fees).  
Further, the family court briefly stated that "[t]he entries in [Husband's] fee 
affidavit indicated that discovery was resisted initially by [Wife] or her previous 
attorneys," but we find little evidence in the record that Wife was uncooperative or 
hindered litigation. Husband testified Wife resisted discovery and unnecessarily 
delayed the case; however, he submitted no proof that Wife's actions amounted to 
actual misconduct sufficient to warrant the imposition of all of Husband's 
attorney's fees against Wife. Accordingly, we find that requiring Wife to pay all of 
Husband's attorney's fees was improper.  Cf. Simpson, 377 S.C. at 539–40, 660 
S.E.2d at 285 (upholding fee award due to husband's lack of candor with the family
court and his failure to fully cooperate throughout the litigation process); Taylor v. 
Taylor, 333 S.C. 209, 216–17, 508 S.E.2d 50, 54–55 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the 
family court properly required husband to pay all of wife's attorney's fees when 
husband was overly litigious, uncooperative, and largely disorganized throughout 
the discovery and litigation process).  Reiterating our de novo standard of review 
and the equities inherent in family court proceedings, we modify the family court's 
attorney's fees award and require Wife to contribute $15,000 toward Husband's 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the family court's order is  
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and MCDONALD, J., concur. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. (PDHC) appeals 
the circuit court's award of sanctions to the estate of Hugh S. Thompson, III (the 
Estate) pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP.  PDHC argues the court erred in failing to 
dismiss the Estate's motion for sanctions as untimely, granting Rule 11 sanctions 
when PDHC's filings and arguments to the court were not frivolous, awarding 
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sanctions for the thirty hours the Estate's counsel spent responding to discovery 
requests served upon third parties, not reducing the award for the time the Estate's 
counsel spent preparing the sanctions motion, and ignoring the Estate's inequitable 
conduct when deciding to grant sanctions.  The Estate cross-appeals, arguing the 
court erred in concluding its claim for sanctions under the South Carolina 
Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act1 (the FCPSA) was untimely and not 
awarding additional sanctions. We vacate in part and affirm in part. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Although this case has a long procedural history, the instant appeal arises out of a 
sanctions order the circuit court entered against PDHC after this court issued a 
remittitur in the case.  PDHC, a professional medical association doing business in 
Darlington, South Carolina, formerly employed Thompson as a medical doctor in 
its clinic from late 1998 to 2000.  In exchange for his salary, Dr. Thompson 
assigned PDHC the rights to his Medicare payments, and PDHC billed Medicare 
for his services. 
Several years before Dr. Thompson began working for PDHC, the South Carolina 
Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) suspended his medical license and, as a 
regulatory requirement, he was excluded from the Medicare program by the 
Medicare Office of the Inspector General (OIG).  Although the Board later 
reinstated Dr. Thompson's medical license in 1998, he failed to seek removal of his 
name from OIG's list of excluded providers until 2002.  In 2007, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid demanded that PDHC return over $200,000 in benefits it 
collected while Dr. Thompson was on the excluded provider list.
Following an unsuccessful federal administrative appeal, PDHC filed an action in 
probate court against the Estate in 2010, seeking reimbursement for the money it 
was required to pay back to Medicare.  The Estate disallowed the claim, and 
PDHC removed the action to circuit court.  Subsequently, the Estate sought to 
disqualify PDHC's attorney, Tony R. Megna, on the ground that—as PDHC's chief 
executive officer—he was a necessary fact witness in the case. The court agreed 
and disqualified Megna in an order dated April 15, 2011.  PDHC filed a motion to 
alter or amend the disqualification order on May 2, 2011.  
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 through -100 (2005 & Supp. 2015). 
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The Estate and PDHC then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  To avoid 
any potential prejudice to PDHC, the circuit court allowed Megna to appear for the 
limited purpose of arguing the pending summary judgment motions at the July 19, 
2011 hearing before it ruled upon PDHC's motion to alter or amend the 
disqualification order. The court subsequently denied PDHC's motion to alter or 
amend its disqualification order on August 15, 2011.  In its order, the court 
quashed all motions, subpoenas, and filings made subsequent to June 17, 2011, that 
contained only Megna's signature.   
On September 1, 2011, the circuit court issued an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Estate, finding PDHC's fault for not satisfying its 
nondelegable duty to ensure the proper credentialing of its employee was 
dispositive as to all causes of action.  The court later dismissed PDHC's motion to 
alter or amend the summary judgment order as void ab initio because Megna's
signature was the only one to appear on the motion in violation of the court's 
disqualification order. 
PDHC filed various appeals with this court regarding the circuit court's summary 
judgment order, disqualification order, and order dismissing PDHC's appeal from 
the probate court.  This court consolidated the appeals and issued an unpublished 
opinion on July 3, 2013, in which it dismissed PDHC's appeal of the summary 
judgment order as untimely, found the disqualification issue was moot, and 
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of PDHC's appeal of the probate court's order.  
See Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Thompson, 2013-UP-311 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 
July 3, 2013). This court denied PDHC's petition for rehearing, and our supreme 
court later denied its petition for a writ of certiorari.  The court of appeals issued a 
remittitur in the case on January 7, 2014. 
Nine days after the remittitur was issued, on January 16, 2014, the Estate filed a 
motion in circuit court for sanctions—pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and the 
FCPSA—against PDHC, Megna, Benjamin R. Matthews, and Matthews & Megna, 
LLC. In its motion, the Estate claimed it expended at least $96,580 in attorney's
fees defending against PDHC's allegedly meritless lawsuit as well as Megna's
violation of the circuit court's disqualification order. PDHC filed a motion to strike 
the Estate's motion for sanctions under the FCPSA, arguing the circuit court no 
longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because the motion was 
untimely. 
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At the conclusion of a hearing on the motions, the circuit court announced it would 
award sanctions. The court, however, directed the Estate to submit a supplemental 
fee affidavit segregating the amount of time spent addressing Megna's violations of 
the disqualification order and filing the motion for sanctions.  After the Estate 
submitted a fee affidavit listing $60,300 for these expenses, the court awarded it 
$34,150 in sanctions against PDHC, Megna, and his law firm pursuant to Rule 11.  
Nevertheless, the court declined to award sanctions pursuant to the FCPSA.  
PDHC filed a motion to alter or amend the award of sanctions, and the court 
denied its motion.  This cross-appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision of whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11 or the FCPSA 
is treated as one in equity. Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders & 
Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 104, 713 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2011).  "In an 
action in equity tried by a judge alone, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find 
facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."  In re 
Beard, 359 S.C. 351, 357, 597 S.E.2d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2004).  "However, the 
abuse of discretion standard plays a role in the appellate review of a sanctions 
award." Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. 430, 437, 663 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2008).  When 
the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's factual findings, it reviews the 
award of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard.  Atl. Coast Builders, 394 
S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654. "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the 
imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is 
controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual contentions."  Id.; 
see also Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 370 S.C. 5, 19, 633 S.E.2d 722, 729 
(2006) ("An abuse of discretion may be found if the conclusions reached by the 
court are without reasonable factual support." (quoting Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 
15, 19, 471 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1996))).
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. PDHC's Appeal 
PDHC contends the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the Estate's motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, because the motion was untimely and, 
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.  We agree. 
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The circuit court generally "loses jurisdiction over a case when the time to file 
post-trial motions has elapsed."  Russell, 370 S.C. at 20, 633 S.E.2d at 730 
(footnote omitted).  "Jurisdiction refers to the [circuit] court's authority to retain 
jurisdiction over the case, not the court's subject matter jurisdiction."  Id. at 20 
n.10, 633 S.E.2d at 730 n.10; see also In re Beard, 359 S.C. at 358, 597 S.E.2d at 
838 (explaining the ten-day rule limiting the time within which a party may file a 
post-trial motion is a rule of limitation on the circuit court's ability to retain the 
case, not the power of the court to hear cases of that nature).
Our appellate courts have held that a circuit court cannot entertain a motion for 
sanctions made pursuant to the FCPSA if it is filed more than ten days after 
judgment.  See Russell, 370 S.C. at 20, 633 S.E.2d at 730 (providing "a motion for 
sanctions must be filed within ten days of the notice of the entry of judgment"); In 
re Beard, 359 S.C. at 357, 597 S.E.2d at 838 (noting this court has held "a [circuit] 
court cannot entertain a motion for sanctions under the FCPSA whe[n] that motion 
was filed more than ten days after the judgment"); Pitman v. Republic Leasing Co., 
Inc., 351 S.C. 429, 432, 570 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding the circuit 
court no longer had jurisdiction over the case to award sanctions under the FCPSA 
two months after granting summary judgment and noting that, "because a [circuit 
court] retains jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend a 
judgment within ten days of its issuance, a motion for sanctions would be timely if 
filed within ten days of judgment"). 
In the instant case, however, the circuit court only granted the Estate's motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP.  Rule 11(a), SCRCP, in pertinent part, 
provides the following:
The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground 
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. 
. . . 
If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed or does 
not comply with this Rule, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
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attention of the pleader or movant.  If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Pursuant to Rule 11, "an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, 
motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments."  Burns v. Universal 
Health Servs., Inc., 340 S.C. 509, 513, 532 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ct. App. 2000).  "The 
attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad 
faith (i.e., to cause unnecessary delay) whether or not there is good ground to 
support it."  Id.
The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable 
costs and attorney's fees incurred by the party or parties 
defending against the frivolous action or action brought 
in bad faith, a reasonable fine to be paid to the court, or a 
directive of a nonmonetary nature designed to deter the 
party or the party's attorney from bringing any future 
frivolous action or action in bad faith. Further, if 
appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may 
order a party and/or the party's attorney to pay a 
reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties 
defending against the frivolous action or action brought 
in bad faith. 
Runyon, 322 S.C. at 19, 471 S.E.2d at 162. 
In Burns, this court noted Rule 11 "provides little guidance as to the procedural 
guidelines to be followed prior to the imposition of sanctions under the rule.  The 
rule merely provides that whe[n] a violation occurs, the court, upon motion or its 
own initiative, may impose appropriate sanctions."  340 S.C. at 513, 532 S.E.2d at 
9. Notwithstanding the lack of guidance, this court held "a signing party or 
attorney is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond prior to imposition of 
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sanctions under Rule 11." Id. at 514, 532 S.E.2d at 9. In another case, this court 
indicated that "[t]he criteria for Rule 11 sanctions are essentially the same as those 
for sanctions under the [FCPSA]."  Father v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 345 S.C. 57, 
72, 545 S.E.2d 523, 531 (Ct. App. 2001).  Nevertheless, our supreme court has 
distinguished between sanctions under Rule 11 and the FCPSA, stating no 
requirement exists "that a motion for sanctions made pursuant to Rule 11 be made 
within ten days from notice of entry of judgment."  Russell, 370 S.C. at 20 n.11, 
633 S.E.2d at 730 n.11. In Russell, our supreme court expressly declined to 
determine what time limit for Rule 11 sanctions would be proper because the issue 
was not before the court. See id.  Accordingly, the issue is one of first impression 
for this court. 
Our supreme court has emphasized that "[t]he [South Carolina] Rules of Civil 
Procedure 'shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.'"  Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 15, 625 S.E.2d 205, 
209 (2005) (quoting Rule 1, SCRCP).  "In interpreting the language of a court rule, 
we apply the same rules of construction used in interpreting statutes."  Green ex 
rel. Green v. Lewis Truck Lines, Inc., 314 S.C. 303, 304, 443 S.E.2d 906, 907 
(1994) (per curiam).  "Therefore, the words of [the rule] must be given their plain 
and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or 
expand the rule." Stark Truss Co. v. Superior Constr. Corp., 360 S.C. 503, 508, 
602 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Ct. App. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Green, 314 
S.C. at 304, 443 S.E.2d at 907). "When the language of a court rule is clear and 
unambiguous, the court is obligated to follow its plain and ordinary meaning."  Id.
Courts should consider not only the particular clause in 
which a word may be used, but the word and its meaning 
in conjunction with the purpose of the whole rule and the 
policy of the rule. In construing a rule, language in the 
rule must be read in a sense which harmonizes with its 
subject matter and accords with its general purpose.  
Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. at 15, 625 S.E.2d at 209 (internal citation omitted). 
Rule 11, of course, is silent as to when a party must file a motion for sanctions for 
it to be considered timely.  Thus, we find it necessary to analyze the purposes 
behind the rule.  Our "state rule is based upon the language of the pre-1983 version 
of Federal Rule 11." Burns, 340 S.C. at 513, 532 S.E.2d at 9.  Although the 
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current version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unlike our state 
rule, contains a safe harbor provision, we find the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit's explanation of the purposes behind the rule instructive.  Cf. Renner 
v. Hawk, 481 S.E.2d 370, 374 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (stating decisions pertaining to 
the federal version of Rule 11 are "pertinent to [the] analysis" of the state rule).  
"Under Rule 11, the primary purpose of sanctions against counsel is not to 
compensate the prevailing party, but to 'deter future litigation abuse.'" Hunter v. 
Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Kunstler, 
914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990)).  The expenses opposing counsel incurs in 
combatting frivolous claims is an appropriate factor for a court to consider when 
determining whether to issue a monetary sanction.  In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522. 
"[O]ther purposes of the rule include compensating the victims of the Rule 11 
violation, as well as punishing present litigation abuse, streamlining court
dockets[,] and facilitating court management."  Moore v. Southtrust Corp., 392 F. 
Supp. 2d 724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522).
Regarding the federal rule, scholars have made the following observations: 
Although a motion for sanctions may not be filed or 
presented to the district court until twenty-one days have 
elapsed after service of the motion on the parties, the 
cases under both the 1983 and 1993 versions of the rule 
make clear that Rule 11 proceedings should be initiated 
promptly after the challenged conduct takes place.  The 
Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 amendment 
explains that "[o]rdinarily, the motion should be served 
promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and if 
delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely."  If the 
alleged misconduct occurs during the discovery process 
or another part of the pretrial phase, the matter usually 
should be resolved at once . . . to avoid prejudicing the 
resolution of the litigation's substantive issues on their 
merits and to discourage the possibility of further abuses.  
If the challenged conduct is the institution of the action 
itself or occurs during a hearing or at trial, however, the 
question whether there has been a Rule 11 violation 
generally is not decided until after litigation has 
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completed . . . to avoid delaying the disposition of the 
merits of the case. 
5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1337.1, at 713–15 (3d. ed. 2004) (alteration in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Although the decision of whether to award Rule 11 sanctions is a collateral issue, 
and does not constitute a ruling upon the merits of the case, we do not believe a 
circuit court retains the ability to award sanctions in perpetuity without any 
limitation.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) ("Like 
the imposition of costs, attorney's fees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a 
Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires 
the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial 
process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.  Such a determination may 
be made after the principal suit has been terminated."); id. at 406 (finding the 
respondents' interpretation of Rule 11 to cover any expenses incurred "because of 
the filing" overly broad because it "would lead to the conclusion that expenses 
incurred 'because of' a baseless filing extend indefinitely"). Indeed, as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted, the "[c]ourts that have 
discussed the matter have endorsed the application of time limits on Rule 11 
motions." ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
Jurisdictions are split regarding the timeliness standards used for sanctions 
motions.  Some jurisdictions, for example, impose their own local rules.  See, e.g., 
Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988) ("To carry out 
the objectives of expeditious disposition, we adopt as a supervisory rule for the 
courts in the Third Circuit a requirement that all motions requesting Rule 11 
sanctions be filed in the district court before the entry of a final judgment.  Whe[n]
appropriate, such motions should be filed at an earlier time—as soon as practicable 
after discovery of the Rule 11 violation.").  Others require a party seeking 
sanctions against an opponent to file the motion within a reasonable time after 
discovering the inappropriate conduct. See, e.g., Griffin v. Sweet, 525 S.E.2d 504, 
506 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("Although Rule 11 does not specify a time limit for 
filing a sanctions motion, . . . 'a party should make a Rule 11 motion within a 
reasonable time after he discovers an alleged impropriety.'" (quoting Rice v. 
Danas, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 97, 100 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Renner v. Hawk, 481 S.E.2d 
370, 374 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)); Kaplan v. Zenner, 956 F.2d 149, 152 (7th Cir. 
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1992) (stating "[p]rompt filings of motions for sanctions after discovery of an 
abuse best serve both the systemic and case-specific deterrent functions of Rule 
11," and "reasonableness must serve as the guide" in determining whether a Rule 
11 motion was promptly filed).
In our view, the North Carolina Court of Appeals' treatment of the timeliness issue 
is persuasive. In Griffin, our sister court held "that[,] by waiting over thirteen 
months after [the North Carolina] Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for 
discretionary review, plaintiff failed to file his motion for Rule 11 sanctions within 
a reasonable time of detecting the alleged impropriety."  525 S.E.2d at 508.  
According to the Griffin court, the "plaintiff was put on notice of any alleged 
sanctionable conduct when defendants filed an answer to the supplemental 
complaint . . . and again when the trial court granted summary judgment."  Id.
Although the court explained it was "not suggesting that plaintiff's motion for Rule 
11 sanctions should have been filed at the summary judgment stage," the court— 
applying an objective, de novo standard of review—nevertheless concluded the 
plaintiffs failed to file the motion within a reasonable time. Id. 
Some courts recognize the ability of a party to file a motion for sanctions at the end 
of litigation or after a judgment, but we are unable to find any authority to support 
the proposition that a party can wait until the entire case has finished.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's discussion of the negative consequences of 
allowing such a delay in filing a Rule 11 motion is instructive: 
Promptness in filing valid motions will serve not only to 
foster efficiency, but in many instances will deter further 
violations of Rule 11 which might otherwise occur 
during the remainder of the litigation.  If a party's action 
is "abusive" as contemplated by Rule 11, [then] the 
adversary should be able to realize immediately that an 
offense has occurred. Seldom should it be necessary to 
wait for the district court or the court of appeals to rule 
on the merits of an underlying question of law.  If there is 
doubt how the district court will rule on the challenged 
pleading or motion, [then] the filing of the paper is 
unlikely to have violated Rule 11. . . .  [M]ere failure to 
prevail does not trigger a Rule 11 sanction order. 
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Lingle, 847 F.2d at 99. The Third Circuit further noted that "timely filing and 
disposition of Rule 11 motions should conserve judicial energies.  In the district 
court, resolution of the issue before the inevitable delay of the appellate process 
will be more efficient because of current familiarity with the matter."  Id.
Moreover, the court stated that "concurrent resolution of the challenges to the 
merits and the imposition of sanctions avoids the invariable demand on two 
separate appellate panels to acquaint themselves with the underlying facts and the 
parties' respective legal positions."  Id.  According to the court, "[t]he fragmented 
appeals" in that case "graphically illustrate[d] the inefficiency resulting from delay 
in filing a sanction motion until after resolution of the merits appeal."  Id. 
Because Rule 11, SCRCP, is silent regarding when a motion sought thereunder 
would be considered timely, we decline to read any specific time limits into the 
rule. We do, however, hold that a party must file a motion for sanctions pursuant 
to Rule 11 within a reasonable time of discovering the alleged improprieties to 
comport with the purposes of the rule.  Turning to the instant case, the Estate filed 
its motion for sanctions nine days after this court issued a remittitur.2  In other 
words, the Estate waited over twenty-eight months after the circuit court granted 
summary judgment in its favor, and some thirty-three months after the court 
disqualified Megna, to file a motion for sanctions against PDHC and its counsel.  
In light of our thorough review of the record, as well as the various authorities 
addressing this issue, we find the Estate's delay in filing the motion for sanctions 
until final resolution of the merits appeal failed to come in line with the underlying 
purposes of Rule 11. 
While the Estate argues that waiting until the conclusion of the case was more 
efficient, we respectfully disagree.  The fact that this court is reviewing yet another 
issue in this contentious case in a separate appeal only further demonstrates the 
point that it was inefficient for the Estate to delay in bringing the motion for 
sanctions. We agree that Megna's behavior was concerning, particularly given that 
the law regarding his recusal was so clear.  See Rule 3.7(a), RPC, Rule 407, 
SCACR ("A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely 
2 As our supreme court has explained, once the remittitur is sent down from an 
appellate court, the circuit court acquires jurisdiction over the case to enforce the 
judgment and take any action consistent with the appellate court's ruling.  See 
Muller v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 313 S.C. 412, 414–15, 438 S.E.2d 248, 
250 (1993). 
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to be a necessary witness . . . .").  The main purpose of Rule 11, however, is to 
defer future litigation abuse, not compensate the opposing party.  By waiting until 
the case has been fully litigated and decided by the appellate courts on the merits, 
the Estate failed to challenge or prevent any litigation abuse from occurring in this 
case. Instead, the Estate made the tactical decision of waiting until the conclusion 
of the case to recover attorney's fees for all of the abuses that took place over a 
three-year period. In our view, the Estate's delay in bringing the motion for 
sanctions failed to serve the deterrence and efficiency purposes of Rule 11 and, 
therefore, was unreasonable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that sanctions may have been warranted in this case, we 
hold the Estate failed to file its motion within a reasonable time of discovering 
PDHC's alleged improprieties.  Given that the motion was untimely, we are 
constrained to find the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions 
because the award was controlled by an error of law.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
court's award of Rule 11 sanctions.3 
II. The Estate's Cross-Appeal 
On cross-appeal, the Estate argues the circuit court erred in concluding the Estate's
claim to sanctions under the FCPSA was untimely and denying the corresponding 
award of fees for time spent in response to PDHC's motion to strike.  We disagree. 
The FCPSA, in pertinent part, provides the following: 
At the conclusion of a trial and after a verdict for or a
verdict against damages has been rendered or a case has 
been dismissed by a directed verdict, summary judgment, 
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, upon motion of 
the prevailing party, the court shall proceed to determine 
if the claim or defense was frivolous.
3 In light of our finding that the Estate's motion for Rule 11 sanctions was 
untimely, we decline to address PDHC's remaining issues on appeal.  See Futch v. 
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (holding the appellate court need not address remaining issues when its 
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-10(C)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 
As discussed in Part I, supra, our case law is quite clear regarding the time frame 
within which a party must file a motion for sanctions pursuant to the FCPSA.  See 
Russell, 370 S.C. at 20, 633 S.E.2d at 730 (providing "a motion for sanctions must 
be filed within ten days of the notice of the entry of judgment"); In re Beard, 359 
S.C. at 357, 597 S.E.2d at 838 (noting this court has held "a [circuit] court cannot 
entertain a motion for sanctions under the FCPSA whe[n] that motion was filed 
more than ten days after the judgment"); Pitman, 351 S.C. at 432, 570 S.E.2d at 
189 (finding the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction over the case to award 
sanctions under the FCPSA two months after granting summary judgment and 
noting that, "because a [circuit court] retains jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, to alter or amend a judgment within ten days of its issuance, a motion for 
sanctions would be timely if filed within ten days of judgment"). 
 
Nevertheless, the Estate—mounting, in essence, a direct challenge to our 
precedent—asks us to extend the meaning of "at the conclusion of the trial" to the 
period following the remittitur of a case from an appellate court.  We decline the 
Estate's invitation to adopt such an unduly expansive reading of the FCPSA.  If the 
General Assembly wished to extend the time window to ten days following the 
remittitur, as opposed to ten days following judgment, then it would have included 
that in the list found in subsection 15-36-10(C)(1). 
 
Accordingly, because the circuit court correctly found the Estate did not prevail on 
the FCPSA issue in its motion for sanctions, we affirm its denial of the 
corresponding award of fees for time spent in response to PDHC's motion to 
strike.4  
  
4 Because our resolution of the prior issues is dispositive in this appeal, we decline 
to address the Estate's remaining issue.  See Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 
598 (holding the appellate court need not address remaining issues when its 
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
74
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we VACATE the award of Rule 11 sanctions and 
AFFIRM the circuit court's decision not to award sanctions pursuant to the 
FCPSA.5 
HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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he obtained against Lancaster's uncle.  On appeal, Lancaster argues the underlying 
judgment was no longer enforceable and challenges the findings that he and his 
uncle engaged in various fraudulent conveyances.  We affirm.1 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From 1946 until approximately 1992, Lancaster's maternal uncle, Rudolph Robert 
Drews, owned and operated "The Drews Company," a construction business in 
Charleston, South Carolina. During his high school and college years, Lancaster 
worked at The Drews Company and became close to both Drews and Drews's wife, 
Effie. According to Lancaster, The Drews Company suffered financially after 
Hurricane Hugo in 1989 as a result of the acts of an unscrupulous business 
associate who absconded with customer deposits for lucrative jobs.  As a result of 
this misfortune, the Drewses began borrowing heavily on their home in an effort to 
raise revenue for their business.  The situation worsened when the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) filed liens against Drews and his business.  Drews sold 
what was left of his business to Dorsey Biller, who had been the General Manager 
of The Drews Company. The Drewses decided to sell their home to raise funds to 
pay the various IRS liens and outstanding loans associated with The Drews 
Company.  Lancaster asserted the Drewses had $100,000 "[a]fter appropriately 
paying off the IRS and satisfying other standing debts."2 
In May 1992, at Drews's request, Lancaster used the $100,000 allegedly remaining 
from the sale of Drews's residence, along with $60,000 of his own funds to 
purchase 17 Bainbridge Drive, in Charleston, South Carolina.  On May 22, 1992, 
Lancaster executed an agreement purporting to grant the Drewses a life estate in 
this property. The agreement was not a deed and was not recorded in the public 
records. It does not reference the $100,000 Drews gave to Lancaster to purchase 
the property, and it indicated the consideration for the conveyance of the life estate
was "the sum of TEN ($10.00) AND NO/100S DOLLARS and love and affection 
for my uncle and aunt."
1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
2 Contrarily, the court noted that for the remainder of his life, Drews had "pending 
creditor claims, including IRS assessments and liens . . . ."
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On June 12, 1992, Lancaster obtained a $40,000 open-ended mortgage on the 
Bainbridge Property. From 1993 to 1995, Lancaster paid Drews $40,000 in checks 
drawn from the bank from which the $40,000 line of credit was obtained, 
supposedly for the purpose of helping the Drewses pay their living expenses.  
Drews, however, paid the interest incurred on the line of credit, but did not sign 
any IOUs or notes of indebtedness for the disbursements.  Lancaster maintained he 
used a spreadsheet to document payments by Drews on the loan and updated the 
entries contemporaneously with the corresponding events; however, Lancaster was 
unable to explain a discrepancy between the spreadsheet produced during his 
deposition and the one at trial.
In March 1995, Drews granted Lancaster a $40,000 mortgage on real property 
Drews owned at 1705 Meeting Street, Charleston, South Carolina.  The mortgage 
was not recorded until November 1995.  Drews did not execute a note on the 
mortgage, and Lancaster did not provide any contemporaneous consideration for it. 
On April 27, 1995, Drews, as attorney-in-fact for Lancaster, signed an agreement 
to purchase a residence at 2 Nuffield Road, in Charleston, South Carolina.  
Lancaster claimed he and Drews agreed they would substitute a one-story house 
chosen by the Drewses for the Bainbridge property because of medical problems 
with Drews's knees.  Lancaster claimed he gave Drews a power of attorney to sign 
a sales contract on Lancaster's behalf; however, at trial, Lancaster could not find 
the document granting this authority, and no such document could be found in the 
public records. Mrs. Drews paid the $1,000 deposit on the home.  On May 15, 
1995, Lancaster increased the $40,000 line of credit to $79,250 and purchased the 
Nuffield property for $125,000 the following day.  On May 17, 1995, Lancaster 
executed a "Memorandum of Lease and Subordination Agreement" for the 
Nuffield property that actually granted the Drewses a life tenancy in the property 
for consideration of $10.00 "and other good and valuable consideration."  The 
document was recorded; however, it was titled as a "lease" rather than as a deed. 
In 1996, Drews and his business partner, Raymond Beasley, opened a hardware 
store in Charleston. The store, known as Builders Station, was incorporated, and 
its board of directors approved a business plan and capital structure that provided 
for the sale of stock to outside investors.  Gordon, one of the outside investors, 
purchased fifty shares of stock on September 9, 1996, for $50,000, on his mother's
behalf and with her funds. The business failed and ultimately closed in 1997.  
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On April 15, 1998, Drews granted Lancaster a $100,000 mortgage on the Meeting 
Street property, again without executing a note and without contemporaneous 
consideration from Lancaster.  The mortgage was filed on May 4, 1998.  However, 
contrary to Lancaster's position at trial that this mortgage was intended to replace 
the $40,000 mortgage Drews granted Lancaster in March 1995, no satisfaction of 
the $40,000 mortgage was filed contemporaneously with the creation of the 
$100,000 mortgage. 
In April 1999, Gordon, as attorney-in-fact for Dorothy Gordon, filed a lawsuit 
against Drews, claiming the sale of the stock in Builders Station was illegal and 
fraudulent under the Uniform Securities Act and also asserting claims for common-
law misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.  
In July 1999, three months after Gordon filed his action against Drews, Drews 
granted Lancaster a $20,000 mortgage on the Meeting Street property.  As with the 
two prior mortgages Drews gave to Lancaster on the same property, there was no 
contemporaneous consideration from Lancaster and no note.  
On November 5 and 6, 2001, Lancaster executed satisfactions of the three 
mortgages on the Meeting Street property.  By deed dated November 6, 2001, 
Drews conveyed this property to Charleston Antiques District, LLC, for $205,000.  
On November 7, 2001, Drews received a $190,000 note and mortgage from 
Charleston Antiques as consideration for the purchase.  Drews simultaneously 
assigned this note and mortgage to Effie Drews.  
On November 7, 2001, Mrs. Drews gave Lancaster a note for $50,912 that was 
secured by the assignment of the mortgage on the Meeting Street property.  
Lancaster explained he received $11,089.63 from the sale, which reduced the 
balance on the amount the Drewses owed him to $50,912.  According to Lancaster, 
as Charleston Antiques made monthly payments of about $2,400 on its $190,000 
note and mortgage, Drews made corresponding monthly payments of about $540,
eventually reducing the balance on the $50,912 note to $35,621.12.  
Following a three-day jury trial in December 2001, Gordon received a judgment of 
$50,000 against Drews, plus $15,789.12 in interest. On March 14, 2002, Gordon 
was awarded $42,693.50 in attorney's fees, for a total judgment of $108,482.62. 
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Drews appealed the judgment awarded to Gordon.  On April 12, 2004, this court 
affirmed the judgment.  Gordon v. Drews, 358 S.C. 598, 595 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 
2004). On September 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied 
certiorari in the matter, and Gordon received an additional award on September 28, 
2005, of $1,467.21 in appellate court costs and expenses.  
In September 2005, Charleston Antiques sold the Meeting Street property to 
unrelated third parties. As a result of the sale, Drews, by way of his wife, received 
the final payment of $130,293.37 on the $190,000 note and mortgage. On 
September 26, 2005, Lancaster received a final payment of $35,621.12, for which 
he issued a satisfaction, and assigned back to Effie Drews the $190,000 mortgage.  
In August 2006, the circuit court issued an order for supplemental proceedings to 
aid Gordon in obtaining satisfaction of the judgment. The Master-in-Equity for 
Charleston County held a hearing in the matter on September 26, 2006; the Master 
continued the hearing and left the supplemental proceedings open because Drews 
did not provide certain court-ordered documents.  During the hearing, Gordon's 
attorney expressed suspicion that Effie Drews and Lancaster were "intertwined in 
this" and indicated she wanted to subpoena Mrs. Drews, Lancaster, and any new 
property owners counsel deemed necessary to give a full picture of what happened 
with assets that had once been owned by Drews.  
Drews died on September 25, 2007, and his estate was opened the following 
month.  In February 2010, an inventory and appraisement was filed indicating 
there were no assets in Drews's estate.  On February 26, 2010, Lancaster gave a 
deposition in the supplemental proceedings.  During the deposition, Gordon 
became aware of the transfers between Drews and Lancaster that allegedly resulted 
in Drews's insolvency. 
Effie Drews died on February 27, 2010, two days before she was scheduled to give 
a deposition in the supplemental proceedings.  Her estate was filed on March 30, 
2010, with her sister, Jessie B. Atkinson named as personal representative.  Effie's 
estate was valued at $55,460.44.
In November 2010, Gordon filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for the 
Ninth Judicial Circuit against Drews's Estate, Effie Drews's Estate, and Lancaster.  
Gordon later filed a petition in the Charleston County Probate Court against 
Atkinson in her capacity as personal representative of Effie Drews's estate, 
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Lancaster, and Shirrese Brockington, in her capacity as special administrator of 
Drews's estate.  In November 2011, Gordon settled with Drews's estate and Effie 
Drews's estate, both of which assigned Gordon their rights against Lancaster.  The 
probate court also issued a consent order for removal of the case to the circuit 
court. 
The present action came before the circuit court on June 13-14, 2013, for a nonjury 
trial. Following the presentation of testimony by both sides, Lancaster moved for a 
directed verdict, arguing the judgment Gordon was attempting to collect was 
extinguished.  The circuit court denied the motion.  
By order filed August 19, 2013, the circuit court found Gordon proved the 
fraudulent nature of all the alleged transfers, including the following: (1) the 1992 
transfer of $100,000 for the purchase of the Bainbridge property; (2) the Nuffield 
property substitution; (3) the first mortgage of $40,000 on the Meeting Street 
property; (4) the second mortgage of $100,000 on the Meeting Street property; (5) 
the third mortgage of $20,000 on the Meeting Street property; and (6) the 
assignment of the $190,000 mortgage on the Meeting Street property.  The court 
further noted that "[w]hile some of the transfers between Drews and Lancaster 
occurred prior to the September 1996 accrual of the underlying action resulting in 
[Gordon's] [j]udgment, [Gordon] has presented evidence that the transfers between 
Drews and Lancaster involved actual moral fraud as is required to set aside 
transfers that occurred before Gordon became a creditor."  Based on these findings, 
the circuit court granted Gordon judgment against Lancaster for $211,677.30.  The 
circuit court later issued a supplemental order dismissing Gordon's claims for 
constructive trust, civil conspiracy, and negligence/aiding and abetting. 
Lancaster's post-trial motions were denied, and this appeal followed. 
81
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Enforceability of the Judgment 
Lancaster argues the judgment Gordon obtained against Drews expired by 
operation of law before the present action was decided and could not be enforced 
against Lancaster. We disagree.3 
Section 15-39-30 of the South Carolina Code (2005) currently reads as follows: 
§ 15-39-30. Issuance of executions; effective period. 
Executions may issue upon final judgments or decrees at 
any time within ten years from the date of the original 
entry thereof and shall have active energy during such 
period, without any renewal or renewals thereof, and this 
whether any return may or may not have been made 
during such period on such executions.
In Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 185, 512 S.E.2d 123, 
128 (Ct. App. 1999), this court held that even though the judgment creditor 
exercised due diligence in discovering the debtor's fraudulent conveyance of 
3 Gordon correctly argues that Lancaster, in requesting dismissal of this action, 
made a directed verdict motion when he should have moved for an involuntary 
nonsuit. See Waterpointe I Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Paragon, Inc., 342 S.C. 454, 
458, 536 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting Rule 50, SCRCP "by its nature is 
applicable to jury trials" and "the proper motion for [the appellant] to have made
was a motion for involuntary non-suit under Rule 41, SCRCP").  However, 
Lancaster's incorrect terminology does not warrant a refusal on the part of this 
court to address the merits of his motion.  See Dorchester Cty. v. Branton, 286 S.C. 
20, 22, 331 S.E.2d 377, 378 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating the court would overlook the 
appellants' "semantic lapse and treat their motion as having been properly made for 
involuntary nonsuit of the case pending against them" so that the appellants 
"w[ould] not be prevented from having their argument on appeal addressed on its 
merits"). 
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property to a third party and attempted to execute upon the wrongfully conveyed 
property more than one year before the expiration of the ten-year enforcement 
period, these circumstances did not extend the life of the creditor's judgment 
beyond the ten-year period provided for in section 15-39-30.  In so holding, this 
court explained: 
Here we have an enforcement action wherein 
Commercial Credit seeks to foreclose its lien against 
Riddle's property pursuant to a judgment of limited 
duration. The public policy of this state is to limit the life
of a judgment to ten years. While this court does not 
condone efforts by judgment debtors to secrete assets to 
avoid payment of judgment, "[a] judgment creditor 
should recognize this [public] policy and proceed 
expeditiously to conclude his efforts to collect his 
judgment within the ten year period."
Id. (quoting Wells ex rel. A.C. Sutton & Sons, Inc. v. Sutton, 299 S.C. 19, 22, 382 
S.E.2d 14, 16 (Ct. App. 1989) (alterations by the court)).
In The Linda Mc Company v. Shore, 390 S.C. 543, 553-55, 703 S.E.2d 499, 504-05 
(2010), the Supreme Court of South Carolina took a less rigid approach in 
interpreting section 15-39-30.  The judgment at issue in Linda Mc was subject to 
execution and levy until June 2, 2005. Id. at 548 n.1, 703 S.E.2d at 501 n.1. By 
that date, the special referee had conducted a supplemental hearing to determine 
whether the debtors had assets to satisfy the balance of the judgment.  Id. at 549-
50, 703 S.E.2d at 502.  The order authorizing the execution and levy upon debtors'
assets was issued June 3, 2005, the day after the judgment expired.  Id. at 550, 703 
S.E.2d at 502. In allowing the execution to proceed, the court stated: 
[W]hen a party has complied with the applicable statutes, 
as Respondent did in this case, and is merely waiting on a 
court's order regarding execution and levy, the ten year 
limitation found in section 15-39-30 is extended to when 
the court finally issues an order. To hold otherwise would 
put those trying to enforce their judgments at the mercy 
of the court system to conclude the matter within the ten-
year period.
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Id. at 554-55, 703 S.E.2d at 505.  We hold the circuit court in this case correctly 
ruled that under Linda Mc, Gordon could still obtain satisfaction of his judgment 
because he filed his action against Lancaster within the ten-year statutory period of 
active energy.  See id. at 554 n.7, 703 S.E.2d at 505 n.7 (acknowledging the 
equitable approach of Hardee v. Lynch, 212 S.C. 6, 14, 46 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1948), 
which recognized an exception to nullification of a judgment after ten years if an 
action was brought prior to the expiration of the ten years).  Gordon's amended 
complaint alleged the judgment remained unsatisfied, and the hearing in the 2006 
supplemental proceedings was left open due to the judgment debtor's failure to 
produce documents. The trial court considered the action as "commenced by 
[Gordon] to aid in executing on [the j]udgment."  We find the action was filed to 
aid in enforcing the judgment.  See Russell v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 86, 89, 
406 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991) ("[P]leadings in a case should be construed liberally so 
that substantial justice is done between the parties.").  Like the court in Linda Mc, 
we find the action was active because it was filed before the ten-year period 
expired and Gordon continued to pursue satisfaction of his judgment.4 
II. Fraudulent Conveyances5 
Lancaster argues the circuit court erred in finding the following transactions 

constituted fraudulent conveyances: (1) the $100,000 Drews paid to Lancaster in 

1992; (2) the $40,000 Lancaster loaned to Drews; and (3) the $20,000 mortgage 

Drews gave Lancaster.  We disagree. 

The evidentiary standard governing fraudulent conveyance claims brought under 

the Statute of Elizabeth is the clear and convincing standard. Oskin v. Johnson, 

400 S.C. 390, 396, 735 S.E.2d 459, 463 (2012).  "An action to set aside a 

conveyance under the Statute of Elizabeth is an equitable action, and a de novo 

4 We decline to address Gordon's additional sustaining ground.  See I'On, L.L.C. v. 

Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (holding 

when reversing a lower court's decision it is within an appellate court's discretion 

as to whether to address any additional sustaining grounds).

5 We combine Lancaster's issues challenging separate findings of fraudulent 

conveyance. 
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standard of review applies." Id.  "However, this broad scope [of review] does not 
relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings[,]
. . . [and] we are not required to disregard the findings of the trial judge, who was 
in a better position to determine the credibility of the witnesses."  Ballard v. 
Roberson, 399 S.C. 588, 593, 733 S.E.2d 107, 109 (2012). 
A. 1992 Payment of $100,000 
Lancaster argues the circuit court erred in finding the 1992 payment of $100,000 
was a fraudulent conveyance.  We disagree. 
Section 27-23-10(A) of the South Carolina Code (2007) provides as follows: 
Every gift, grant, alienation, bargain, transfer, and 
conveyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, goods 
and chattels or any of them, or of any lease, rent, 
commons, or other profit or charge out of the same, by 
writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment, and 
execution which may be had or made to or for any intent 
or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and 
others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, 
accounts, damages, penalties, and forfeitures must be 
deemed and taken (only as against that person or persons, 
his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators 
and assigns, and every one of them whose actions, suits, 
debts, accounts, damages, penalties, and forfeitures by 
guileful, covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices 
are, must, or might be in any ways disturbed, hindered, 
delayed, or defrauded) to be clearly and utterly void, 
frustrate and of no effect, any pretense, color, feigned 
consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or 
thing to the contrary notwithstanding. 
In the recent decision of Judy v. Judy, 403 S.C. 203, 208-09, 742 S.E.2d 672, 675 
(Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations omitted) (first alteration in original), this court 
stated the following regarding the application of section 27-23-10:
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The Statute of Elizabeth "does not limit its application to 
judgment creditors. Its protection also extends to other 
types of parties defrauded in connection with the 
conveyance of property. . . ." 
Subsequent creditors may have conveyances set aside 
when (1) the conveyance was "voluntary," that is, 
without consideration, and (2) it was made with a view to 
future indebtedness or with an actual fraudulent intent on 
the part of the grantor to defraud creditors.  Subsequent 
creditors must show "actual moral fraud," rather than 
legal fraud. Actual moral fraud involves "a conscious 
intent to defeat, delay, or hinder [one's] creditors in the 
collection of their debts." With a voluntary int[ra]-family 
transfer, the burden shifts to the transferee to establish 
the transfer was valid. 
In determining whether a transferee has met his burden to show the bona fides of a 
conveyance, the court will look to whether there are indicia of "badges of fraud," 
including insolvency or indebtedness of the transferor, lack of consideration for the 
conveyance, a close relationship between the transferor and the transferee, 
pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or concealment, departure from the usual 
method of business, reservation of benefit to the transferor, and the retention by the 
transferor of possession of the property allegedly conveyed.  Coleman v. Daniel, 
261 S.C. 198, 209, 199 S.E.2d 74, 79 (1973).  "[W]he[n] there is a concurrence of 
several such badges of fraud[,] an inference of fraud may be warranted."  Id. at 
210, 199 S.E.2d at 79 (first alteration in original).
We find the record has evidence of multiple badges of fraud warranting setting 
aside Drews's 1992 payment to Lancaster.  First, Lancaster was Drews's nephew 
and there was ample evidence indicating their multiple transactions departed from
the usual method of business. Although Lancaster argued the Drewses were debt 
free in 1992 after they sold their home, there was no documentary evidence the 
liens had been discharged or the sales proceeds were sufficient to pay off 
outstanding obligations. To the contrary, Gordon submitted evidence of a federal 
tax lien of $56,988.85 had been filed against the Drewses in September 2000 for 
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997.  Furthermore, contrary to Lancaster's assertion that 
the Drewses were able to pay off pending tax liens with the proceeds from the sale 
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of their home in 1992, counsel's questions during the supplemental proceedings 
suggest the public records show the home sold for only $5 and Drews, though 
testifying he did not think the house sold for that price, would not reveal what he 
actually received for the property and could not explain why the stated 
consideration according to the public records was only $5.  Considering the badges 
of fraud, including Drews's insolvency, the failure to follow the usual formalities in 
granting a life estate, and Drews's retention of benefits in the funds conveyed, we 
affirm the circuit court's finding that the 1992 transfer of funds involved actual 
moral fraud and could be set aside even though it occurred before Gordon became 
a creditor.
B. $40,000 Loan from Lancaster to Drews 
Lancaster next argues the circuit court erred in finding the $40,000 he paid to the 
Drewses between 1993 and 1995 constituted fraudulent conveyances.  We 
disagree. 
We find ample evidence in the record indicating the payments were not loans to 
the Drewses, but rather the payments constituted a surreptitious scheme to return to 
Drews a portion of the $100,000 Drews provided Lancaster in 1992.  Shortly after 
the Bainbridge purchase, Lancaster obtained a $40,000 open-end, equity line 
mortgage on the property.  From 1993 until 1995, Lancaster paid Drews a total of 
$40,000. Drews paid the interest on the line of credit.  Also, Drews did not 
acknowledge the debt in writing or make payments to Lancaster on it.  Finally, 
Lancaster presented no evidence of an arrangement with Drews regarding 
repayment of the alleged loans.  We agree with the circuit court's finding that 
Lancaster's payments to Drews totaling $40,000 from 1993 until 1995 were for the 
purpose of returning to Drews part of the $100,000 transfer and involved actual 
moral fraud.   
C. $20,000 Mortgage 
Lancaster also argues the circuit court erred in finding the July 1999 mortgage of 
$20,000 on the Meeting Street property was the result of actual moral fraud.  We 
disagree. 
The circuit court noted Lancaster did not give Drews any contemporaneous 
consideration for the mortgage and no note was executed.  Furthermore, the circuit 
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court found "Lancaster gave contradictory testimony that he was not 
contemporaneously aware of the $20,000 Meeting Street Mortgage while later 
testifying that he did participate in its genesis and that the purpose of the Third 
Mortgage was to fund a settlement on a bank guarantee."  The circuit court appears 
to have rejected Lancaster's assertion that Drews granted him the mortgage in 
return for past consideration. We agree with the circuit court's findings that the 
$20,000 mortgage was not supported by either contemporaneous or past valuable 
consideration and constituted actual moral fraud, which were based on credibility 
determinations.  See Clardy v. Bodolosky, 383 S.C. 418, 424, 679 S.E.2d 527, 530 
(Ct. App. 2009) (explaining the broad scope of review in an equity proceeding 
"does not require this court to ignore the findings below when the trial court was in 
a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses"). 
III. Directed Verdict and Post-Trial Motions 
Lancaster finally argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed 
verdict and his post-trial motions seeking reconsideration.  We disagree.6 
"After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the 
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, . . . may move for a dismissal on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief."  
Rule 41(b), SCRCP. Rule 41(b), SCRCP, "allows the judge as the trier of facts to 
weigh the evidence, determine the facts and render a judgment against the plaintiff 
at the close of his case if justified." Johnson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 308 S.C. 116, 
118, 417 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1992). In reviewing the rulings of a trial judge on 
motions for involuntary nonsuit, this court must review the evidence and all 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rewis v. Grand 
Strand Gen. Hosp., 290 S.C. 40, 41-2, 348 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1986).  If more than 
one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the motion for nonsuit 
must be denied. Id.
In support of his argument, Lancaster reiterates the arguments previously
discussed. We find no error by the circuit court on the merits of those arguments; 
6 As previously noted, we address the directed verdict issue as if it was properly 
raised as a motion for involuntary nonsuit under Rule 41(b), SCRCP. 
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thus, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Lancaster's motion for involuntary 
nonsuit and post-trial motions for reconsideration.  
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS, J., concurs.  
THOMAS, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent and would reverse the circuit 
court's order because the judgment Respondent obtained against Rudolph Robert 
Drews expired by operation of law before the present action was decided and, thus, 
could not be enforced against Appellant.  I disagree with the majority's reliance on 
Linda Mc7 and find the circumstances in this case are distinguishable from those in 
Linda Mc. 
As of March 18, 2012, the final day of the ten-year period following enrollment of 
the judgment, Respondent had only filed the present action in the circuit court and 
settled his allegations against the Drews' estates.  Although Respondent filed this 
action prior to the expiration of the ten-year period, he was not "merely waiting on 
the court's order regarding execution and levy" as was the situation in Linda Mc. 
See Linda Mc, 390 S.C. at 554, 703 S.E.2d at 505 ("[W]hen a party has complied 
with the applicable statutes, as [r]espondent did in this case, and is merely waiting 
on a court's order regarding execution and levy, the ten year limitation found in
section 15-39-30 is extended to when the court finally issues an order.").  Indeed, 
the circuit court did not hold the final hearing in this case until June 2013, more 
than one year after the expiration of the ten-year period.  Based on the facts 
distinguishing this case and Linda Mc, I would decline Respondent's invitation to 
extend Linda Mc's narrow holding to encompass these circumstances.  See id. ("We 
want to stress that this is a narrow holding limited to facts similar to those at issue 
in this case."). I believe extending Linda Mc in this case thwarts the public policy 
7 Linda Mc Co. v. Shore, 390 S.C. 543, 703 S.E.2d 499 (2010).
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of this state that limits the life of a judgment to ten years. See Commercial Credit 
Loans, Inc. v. Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 185, 512 S.E.2d 123, 128 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("The public policy of this state is to limit the life of a judgment to ten years.").  
Additionally, because the majority concludes Respondent's action was active 
simply because he filed it prior to the expiration of the ten-year period, the 
majority's interpretation could effectively allow any judgment holder to extend 
automatically the ten-year period by merely filing a new action to execute prior to 
the expiration of the ten-year period. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the circuit court's order because Respondent's
judgment against Drews expired prior to the circuit court deciding the present 
action and the narrow exception in Linda Mc is inapplicable.   
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